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COVID-19 PROTOCOLS FOR NCAA FOOTBALL AND THE NFL:
DOES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PRODUCE SAFER CONDITIONS
FOR PLAYERS?
Michael H. LeRoy*
Abstract
My study surveyed all NCAA football programs in Power 5
conferences during the 2020 season to compare their COVID-19 safety
protocols to those in the NFL-NFLPA labor agreement. College protocols
lacked input from a players association. In contrast, the NFL and their
players collectively bargained a seventy-two-page agreement for COVID19 protocols. Policies from nineteen college football programs fell far
short of NFL-NFLPA standards, scoring ten to thirty points out of the
forty-five safety points in the NFL labor agreement. College policies were
strongest for symptom checking and cardiac evaluations. However, most
college policies failed to identify players with individual risk factors and
provide them extra medical monitoring; additionally, no college policy
reported using location tracking technology for contact tracing. The
NFLPA also had a whistleblower hotline to report noncompliance with the
labor agreement, but college policies did not. I conclude that collective
bargaining provided NFL football players with superior safeguards
compared to those for college players. Like unionized construction firms,
which have better safety records than nonunion firms, the NFL is safer
than the NCAA for football players because of collectively bargained
practices. This study supports treating college players as employees rather
than amateurs because employment is necessary to form a union.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Research Question and Overview of Methods and Findings
Do college football players have the same safety protections for the COVID-19
virus as union-represented NFL players,1 even though they cannot form a labor
union?2 The pandemic produced a natural experiment to determine if a players
* © 2021 Michael H. LeRoy. Professor, School of Labor and Employment Relations,
and College of Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (mhl@illinois.edu).
1
See NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL-NFLPA COVID-19 PROTOCOLS FOR 2020
SEASON (2020), https://static.www.nfl.com/image/upload/v1604923568/league/qj8bnhpzrnj
evze2pmc9.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ27-GDYZ] [hereinafter ADDENDUM] (providing several
policies and protections to union-represented NFL players).
2
See Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1352–54 (2015) (rejecting an effort by football
players to form a union under the National Labor Relations Act). The Board declined to
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association produces more comprehensive testing and mitigation procedures than
college football, where conferences and schools unilaterally implemented COVID19 protocols.3 The virus posed similar risks to both player groups. Therefore,
protocols for infection testing, quarantining, returning to competition, and contact
tracing should have been similar for professional and college players.
To answer my research question, I sent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests to all fifty-three public universities and colleges in the Power 5 conferences,
and the same request to twelve legal departments of private schools.4 My research
strategy aimed to elicit answers, not rejections, under these laws. Thus, I simplified
and limited my requests.5
The NCAA has been criticized since the 1970s for transmuting a de facto
employment relationship into a self-enriching amateur athlete model.6 My research
assert jurisdiction, noting that while approximately 125 schools comprise the NCAA’s upper
tier of FBS football competition, the NLRA applied to only seventeen private schools.
Allowing only a small fraction of players at these private schools to form a union would
destabilize labor relations and league-based competition in college football. Id. at 1354.
3
Compare Alan Blinder, Lauryn Higgins & Benjamin Guggenheim, College Sports
Has Reported at Least 6,629 Virus Cases. There Are Many More, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/sports/coronavirus-college-sports-football.
html [https://perma.cc/R4AD-BZGG] (stating that “[t]esting standards vary from one
conference to the next” and that over 6,600 student-athletes were infected and a number of
games were canceled), with Kevin Siefert, How the NFL Navigated COVID-19 this Season:
959,860 Tests, $100 Million and Zero Cancellations, ESPN (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/30781978/how-nfl-navigated-covid-19-season-959860
-tests-100-million-zero-cancellations [https://perma.cc/5GLF-EB7F].
4
For the list of private and public schools, see infra Table 1.
5
For my FOIA inquiry, see infra Section III.B.
6
An early article expressing skepticism about the student-athlete model is Stephen
Horn, Intercollegiate Athletics: Waning Amateurism and Rising Professionalism, 5 J.C. &
U.L. 97, 97 (1978) (“Too often the jockeying for power within the NCAA has reflected the
economic positions between institutions rather than concerns about what should be the basic
purpose of the organization: the protection of student-athletes from unscrupulous actions by
those who would exploit them for their own purposes.”). More recently, research has focused
on the strong comparison of NCAA amateurism to professional employment. See Richard
Smith, The Perfect Play: Why the Fair Labor Standards Act Applies to Division I Men’s
Basketball and Football Players, 67 CATH. U.L. REV. 549 (2018); Sam C. Ehrlich, The FLSA
and the NCAA’s Potential Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Day, 39 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 77 (2019); Marc Edelman, From Student-Athletes to Employee-Athletes: Why a “Pay
for Play” Model of College Sports Would Not Necessarily Make Educational Scholarships
Taxable, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1137 (2017); Richard T. Karcher, Big-Time College Athletes’
Status as Employees, 33 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 31 (2017); Jay D. Lonick, Bargaining with
the Real Boss: How the Joint-Employer Doctrine Can Expand Student-Athlete Unionization
to the NCAA as an Employer, 15 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135 (2015); Michelle A. Winters,
Comment, In Sickness and in Health: How California’s Student-Athlete Bill of Rights
Protects Against the Uncertain Future of Injured Players, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 295
(2013); Jeffrey J.R. Sundram, Comment, The Downside of Success: How Increased
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broadens the pay-for-play theme of this perennial critique by suggesting that
employee status for college football players would allow them to form a union and
bargain over safety policies related to COVID-19 infections and long-term health
effects arising from this virus.
To measure the differences between pro and college football procedures, I
broke down the NFL’s seventy-two-page COVID-19 agreement into six categories:
(1) symptom screening,7 (2) COVID-19 testing,8 (3) exposure and positive test
policies,9 (4) quarantining,10 (5) returning to athletic activity,11 and (6) contact
tracing.12 I broke these elements into forty-five points. I created a scorecard for each
Power 5 school that replied with usable information. I scored one point for each
school policy that matched an NFL policy.
My scoring system revealed gaps between pro and college football. The NFL
and Power 5 COVID-19 policies and practices were roughly similar for (1) symptom
identification and screening,13 though the NFL had more stringent standards; (2)
isolation protocols for players who tested positive,14 though the NFL implemented
additional precautions; (3) cardiac screening,15 though the NFL specified a more
thorough process; and (4) policies for returning to practice and games,16 with the
main similarity being a minimum ten-day period of isolation after a player registered
a positive test.
However, my study revealed significant differences between NFL and NCAA
COVID-19 policies and practices, including (1) criteria for high-risk NFL players,
which included individualized risk categories for the NFL but not college players;17
(2) the NFL’s more protective protocols for high-risk players, with suggested
isolation and medical monitoring, essentially treating them like infected players;18
(3) the frequency of COVID-19 testing, with some NCAA schools testing as little
as three times per week, compared to daily testing in the NFL;19 and (4) contact
tracing in the NFL, enabled by wearable tracking equipment that measured player-

Commercialism Could Cost the NCAA Its Biggest Antitrust Defense, 85 TUL. L. REV. 543
(2010); Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or
Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329 (2007); Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian
McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH.
L. REV. 71 (2006).
7
See infra note 122.
8
See infra Finding 3, Bullet Point 2; see also ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 26–27.
9
See infra Finding 3, Bullet Points 3–6; see also ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 60–61.
10
See infra Finding 4; see also ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 9.
11
See infra Finding 5; see also ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 26.
12
See infra Finding 7; see also ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 38.
13
See infra Finding 4, Bullet Point 2 (citing ADDENDUM, supra note 1).
14
See infra Finding 5, Bullet Point 4 (citing ADDENDUM, supra note 1).
15
See infra Finding 6, Bullet Point 2 (citing ADDENDUM, supra note 1).
16
See infra Finding 7.
17
See infra Finding 3, Bullet Points 1 & 4.
18
See infra Finding 5, Bullet Point 3.
19
See infra Finding 4.
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to-player contact on the field and during travel, compared to no policy for wearable
technology contact tracing in college football.20
B. Organization of this Article
In Part II, I explain how NCAA football players are unable to form a union and
engage in collective bargaining.21 Section II.A shows that college players cannot
bargain collectively with their schools because they are not considered employees,
a legal predicate under applicable labor laws.22 Section II.B explores how NFL
players engage in bargaining over their pay and the terms and conditions of their
employment.23 In contrast, as Section II.C shows, the NCAA limits player input to
a Student-Athlete Advisory Committee (SAAC), a captive group that compares to
“company unions” in the 1930s, which employers created to forestall union
representation.24
Part III describes my research design and methods.25 Section III.A applies the
concept of a natural experiment in sports economics to the concurrent development
of COVID-19 policies in union and nonunion football settings in 2020.26 This
framework undergirds my research design, which compares pro football safety
policies that were collectively bargained for and similar policies imposed by schools
on college players.27
Part IV presents my empirical findings.28 In Section IV.A.1, I report the sample
characteristics in Finding 1.29 Section IV.A.2 reports Findings 2–9 for COVID-19
testing policies.30 The main elements of these findings relate to the checklist of
symptoms (Finding 2),31 individualized risk assessment (Finding 3),32 daily
screening for symptoms and COVID-19 testing (Finding 4),33 quarantine testing and
medical monitoring (Finding 5),34 cardiac testing (Finding 6),35 criteria for returnto-activity (Finding 7),36 and contact tracing policies and technology (Finding 8).37
20

See infra Finding 8, Bullet Points 2 & 3.
See infra Part II.
22
See infra Section II.A.
23
See infra Section II.B.
24
See infra Section II.C; infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
25
See infra Part III.
26
See infra Section III.A.
27
See infra Section III.B.
28
See infra Part IV.
29
See infra Section IV.A.1.
30
See infra Section IV.A.2.
31
See infra Table 2.
32
See infra Table 3.
33
See infra Table 4.
34
See infra Table 5.
35
See infra Table 6.
36
See infra Table 7.
37
See infra Table 8.
21
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In Finding 9,38 I pick out chronological milestones in this testing and treatment
sequence—essentially four key points in structuring prevention, treatment, and
mitigation. These findings provide an overall sense of the effectiveness of college
protocols as compared to the NFL-NFLPA procedures.39 Section IV.A.3 compares
scheduling disruptions due to COVID-19 for college and NFL teams.40 Following
this timeline, Finding 11 charts the weekly frequency of game postponements and
cancellations in college versus pro football.41 Section IV.B enumerates caveats and
limitations in this study.42
Part V offers conclusions.43 My findings support studies that show the (A)
superiority of worker safety in unionized versus nonunion work settings,44 (B)
prevalence of company unions long after the 1930s,45 and (C) employment model as
a better way to classify Power 5 football players than as amateurs.46
II. NCAA AND NFL PLAYERS: THE EMPLOYMENT BARRIER TO UNIONIZATION
College football players are not employees.47 The NCAA classifies college
players as amateurs, meaning they fall outside the definition of an employee.48 Thus,
38

See infra Table 9.
This refers to the collective bargaining agreement between the National Football
League and the National Football League Players Association, a labor union for professional
football players. These parties entered into the NFL-NFLPA COVID-19 PROTOCOLS FOR
2020 SEASON. ADDENDUM, supra note 1.
40
See infra Section IV.A.3.
41
See infra Table 11.
42
See infra Section IV.B.
43
See infra Part V.
44
See infra Section V.A.
45
See infra Section V.B.
46
See infra Section V.C.
47
The amateur student-athlete model was upheld recently in two appellate cases that
rejected NCAA player claims that they are employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
See Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019); Berger v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016). But see Livers v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 2018 WL 3609839 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (denying the NCAA’s motion to dismiss).
48
The 2020–21 NCAA Division 1 Manual states as follows:
39

The purposes of this Association are: (a) To initiate, stimulate and improve
intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes and to promote and develop
educational leadership, physical fitness, athletics excellence and athletics
participation as a recreational pursuit; . . . [and] (c) To encourage its members to
adopt eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory standards of scholarship,
sportsmanship and amateurism . . . . A student-athlete may receive athletically
related financial aid administered by the institution without violating the principle
of amateurism, provided the amount does not exceed the cost of education
authorized by the Association; however, such aid as defined by the Association
shall not exceed the cost of attendance as published by each institution. Any other
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college players cannot form a union because collective bargaining laws such as the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),49 Railway Labor Act,50 and state collective
bargaining laws,51 apply only to employees. Moreover, because the NLRA excludes
all public sector employment relationships, fifty-three of the sixty-five (81%) Power
5 football programs cannot engage in legally sanctioned collective bargaining—a
legal barrier that would moot the possibility of collective bargaining for college
football players unless special legislation were enacted for them.52

financial assistance, except that received from one upon whom the student-athlete
is naturally or legally dependent, shall be prohibited unless specifically authorized
by the Association.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2020–21 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 1.2(a), (c)
[hereinafter 2020–21 NCAA MANUAL] (emphasis added).
49
Nat’l Lab. Rel’s. Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2020)). The NLRA defines employee as “any employee . . . unless this
subchapter explicitly states otherwise.” Id. at § 152(3). The same section then excludes “any
individual employed by . . . any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.” Id.
The definition of an employer excludes “any State or political subdivision thereof. . . .” Id.
Thus, players at state universities would need collective bargaining laws in their states to
bargain with their schools over pay and conditions of employment.
An example of a state law that provides for public sector collective bargaining is CONN.
GEN. STATE. ANN., infra note 64. I propose a federal form of NCAA-specific collective
bargaining to address this fractured approach to private- and public-sector collective
bargaining. See infra notes 48, 185.
50
Ry. Lab. Act of 1926, ch. 347, § 1, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §
151, Fifth (2020)) (defining an employee as “every person in the service of a carrier . . . who
performs any work defined as that of an employee or subordinate official in the orders of the
Surface Transportation Board now in effect”). The Railway Labor Act (RLA) is relevant to
my discussion of legislating a federal collective bargaining law that would apply only to
NCAA players. See infra note 190, and related discussion. The RLA and its jurisdiction over
carriers in rail and air transport is analogous to college athletics insofar as the law regulates
transport industries that are especially important to the nation’s economy.
51
E.g., Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA), 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/1–5/21. The IELRA defines an “employee” broadly to include “any individual, excluding
supervisors, managerial, confidential, short term employees, student, and part-time academic
employees of community colleges employed full or part time by an educational employer.”
Id. at 5/2(b) (including exceptions for managerial and confidential employees).
52
The remaining twelve of the sixty-five Power 5 conference schools are private
institutions: Baylor, Boston College, Duke, Northwestern, Notre Dame, Stanford, Syracuse,
TCU, University of Miami, USC, Vanderbilt, and Wake Forest. Notably, only a smattering
of states provide public-sector collective bargaining. If, for example, football players at
Illinois formed a union under the IELRA, this would leave conference schools without a
public sector collective bargaining law at a competitive disadvantage. Id. Wisconsin repealed
its collective bargaining law for virtually all public sector employees, and its action was
upheld in State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436, 441 (Wis. 2011).
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A. College Players Cannot Form a Labor Union Because They Are Not
Employees
The NCAA defines college sports as an activity pursued by “the student body”
that cannot be a part of “professional sports.”53 This idyllic status has roots in the
nineteenth-century cultivation of athletic competition to foster Christian character.54
The NCAA combines intercollegiate athletics with college degree programs by
strictly designating athletes as amateurs.55 Over time, the NCAA has lost touch with
its culture of amateurism—for example, the NCAA continues to declare that college
sports are an “avocation.”56 It believes that its educational mission transcends

53

The purpose of the NCAA is stated as follows:

The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a
vital part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.
2020–21 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 48, at 1.3.1.
54
Professor Karen L. Hartman states that:
In the mid-1800s to the early 1900s, sport became increasingly popular in
America. As technology and manufacturing developed, more and more
Americans turned toward sport as a way to fill their newfound leisure time. During
this time, there were several national organizations and important figures that
served to frame sport as a moral endeavor. Specifically, the Young Men’s
Christian Association (YMCA), the Muscular Christianity Movement, Bernarr
Macfadden and the Physical Culture magazine, Theodore Roosevelt, and the
creation of the National Collegiate Athletics Association worked together to
create an enduring myth of the athlete as a moral hero. People were exposed to
this message if they went to church, listened to a Presidential speech, or read a
magazine; these five factors infiltrated sport and morality into numerous aspects
of society. Modern sport, therefore, was incubated by practitioners of the social
gospel during Protestant Christianity’s time of optimistic missionary revival.
Karen L. Hartman, The Rhetorical Myth of the Athlete as a Moral Hero: The Implications of
Steroids in Sport and the Threatened Myth (2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State
University), https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3014&context=gra
dschool_dissertations [https://perma.cc/23SC-JK37]; See Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 361 (D. Ariz. 1983) (quoting NCAA regulations from that time).
55
See Justice v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 361 (D. Ariz. 1983)
(quoting NCAA regulations from that time).
56
See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 626 (Colo. App. 2004)
(“Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes
should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”)
(emphasis added) (quoting 2020–21 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 48, at art. 2.9)).
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commercialism.57 A student crosses the amateur boundary by signing a contract to
play a professional sport.58
Beginning in the 1950s, and as a result of football-related deaths and injuries,
college football players began to litigate their status as employees.59 Some state
appellate courts in workers’ compensation cases viewed NCAA athletes as
employees.60 However, this trend gave way to court rulings denying college athletes’
claims for workers’ compensation benefits.61 In some instances, state legislation
resolved this ambiguity by excluding college athletes from the workers’
compensation insurance system.62
More recently, NCAA athletes have sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
seeking a ruling that they are employees. So far, their efforts have failed. Two federal
appeals courts have ruled that the amateur student-athlete model precludes a court
from ruling that NCAA athletes are employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.63
The distinction between amateur and employee is crucial because the right to
form a union and engage in collective bargaining is limited to persons in an
employment relationship. Thus, for players at state universities and colleges, it is
significant that state laws providing public-sector collective bargaining rights are
57
See Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D. Ind. 1990)
(stating that the NCAA organizes amateur intercollegiate athletics “as an integral part of the
educational program and . . . retain[s] a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate
athletics and professional sports”).
58
Shelton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1976)
(referencing NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 12.1.2 (c)).
59
See, e.g., Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 428 (Colo. 1953) (ruling that a
student-athlete who hurt his back during the team’s football practice qualified as an employee
who was eligible for worker’s compensation benefits because he “engage[d] in football
games under penalty of losing the job and meals” and therefore “playing football was an
incident of his employment by the University”).
60
See, e.g., Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 170–74 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1963) (holding that the widow and minor children of a student-athlete, who was killed
in a plane crash while returning from a game, were entitled to death benefits under the
California Workmen’s Compensation Act because athletic scholarship was “consideration
. . . paid for services”), superseded by statute, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(a)(11) (West 2018),
as recognized in Shephard v. Loyola Marymount Univ., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 829, 832–33 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002).
61
See Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1174–75 (Ind. 1983);
State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957) (holding that a studentathlete who was fatally injured while playing in a college football game, was not entitled to
a beneficiary death benefit under the Colorado Workmen’s Compensation Act).
62
California excludes college players from worker’s compensation. CAL. LAB. CODE §
3352(a)(11) (West 2018) (excluding a student from the definition of “employee” if they
“participat[e] as an athlete in amateur sporting events sponsored by a . . . public or private
nonprofit college, university, or school, who does not receive remuneration for the
participation, other than the use of athletic equipment, uniforms, transportation, travel, meals,
lodgings, scholarships, grants-in-aid”).
63
See Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019); Berger
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016).
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predicated on an employment relationship.64 More generally, the amateur status of
college athletes led to the futile outcome for football players at Northwestern
University who tried to form a union under the NLRA: The National Labor Relations
Board ended their organizing efforts by declining to assert jurisdiction over cases
involving grant-in-aid football players.65
B. Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports
During the Great Depression, Congress enacted the National Industrial
Recovery Act (N.R.A.).66 The law aimed to foster collective bargaining between
employers and labor unions.67 However, the N.R.A. was a weak law: It allowed
collective bargaining without specifying conditions to require employers to
negotiate terms and conditions of employment with a labor organization.68
Employers did not accept that employees should have an independent voice in their
workplace and instead formed company unions.69 These employee groups were
64

E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31–104.
See Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (2015).
66
Nat’l Indu. Recovery Act (NIRA), ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
67
Edwin E. Witte states that:
65

[E]ssential provisions of this section—the affirmative recognition of the right of
workingmen to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice
and the prohibition of interference by employers with the exercise of this right—
are but restatements of principles previously recognized in several acts of
Congress and, earliest of all, by the National War Labor Board during the World
War, when that board was the supreme authority upon industrial relations in a
large part of American industry.
See Edwin E. Witte, The Background of the Labor Provisions of the N.I.R.A., 1 U. CHI. L.
REV. 572, 573 (1934).
68
Laura J. Cooper expressed that:
Administration of the NIRA by the National Recovery Administration (NRA)
soon revealed the weaknesses of the articulated labor protections in Section 7(a).
Section 7(a) provided no enforcement powers or procedures for selection of
employee representatives. There was no specific list of prohibited employer
actions or requirement for employers to bargain with organizations that
represented their employees. Ambiguities in the Act could be interpreted to
sanction employer-controlled company unions, allow proportional rather than
exclusive representation, and permit individual rather than collective bargaining.
See Laura J. Cooper, Letting the Puppets Speak: Employee Voice in the Legislative History
of the Wagner Act, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 837, 840 (2011).
69
The Department of Labor’s exhaustive study of 14,725 workplaces summarized the
use of company unions by employers in this way:
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often illusory exercises in worker representation: companies wrote their bylaws and
set their agendas.70
Sen. Robert Wagner addressed the failure of the N.R.A. to provide more legal
protection to collective bargaining by introducing the bill that became the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).71 The goal of this Depression-era law, also called the

[T]heir establishment was most frequently due to the pressure of trade-union
activity . . . [and] were set up entirely by management. Management conceived
the idea, developed the plan, and initiated the organization . . . more than half [of
company unions] performed none of those functions which are usually embraced
under the term “collective bargaining.” Some of these were merely agencies for
discussion. Others had become essentially paper organizations after their primary
function was performed when the trade-union was beaten.
U.S. DEP’T. OF LAB., BUREAU LAB. STAT., CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPANY UNIONS 1935
BULL. 634 199–205 (1937).
70
General Motors’ Pontiac plan illustrates employer control of this participatory
process:
This provides for voluntary membership of all employees of the manufacturing
department; that is, voluntary for all employees 21 years or more, with at least 90
days of service and at least first papers. These employees choose their
representatives from among the members of their own division with at least one
year’s service. They meet alone, but the factory manager must be notified of all
meetings. Management is present only when requested. The meeting place is
established by the works council subject to the approval of the plant manager. The
company pays the representatives their regular earned rate, prints the ballots for
elections, and elections are held on company time. In addition, the company will
furnish a stenographer for any meeting on request.
The plan emphasizes that membership is voluntary, but it provides that only
members of the employees association have the right to make a complaint to the
works council with reference to wages, hours of labor, working conditions, or
other appropriate subjects. Only members have a right to take out insurance and
to participate in the company savings and investment plans.
. . . In other words, they offer an inducement to the workers to come into their
company union, and say that he cannot be a beneficiary under these plans
otherwise. . . . In cases of disagreement, appeal is possible all the way up to the
general management of the company, who, it is said, ‘will take up the subject for
consideration.’
To Create a Nat’l Lab. Bd.: Hearing on S. 2926 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 73d
Cong. 128 (1934) [hereinafter Nat’l Lab. Bd. Hearing] (statement of Mr. William Green,
Pres. of the Am. Fed’n of Lab).
71
See id. at 110. Referring to the hearing, Senator Robert Wagner emphasized that:
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Wagner Act, was to give employees a voice in determining their wages and working
conditions.72 This was to be achieved by providing employees equality of bargaining
power with employers.73 Thus, the NLRA provided employees basic collective
bargaining rights—forming a union, bargaining with an employer, and engaging in
concerted activities.74
The law spurred growth in union membership, which peaked in 1954 at 34.7%
of the non-agricultural workforce.75 However, professional athletes did not engage
in collective bargaining with leagues until the 1960s.76 In football, the players
association was involved in protracted antitrust lawsuits that challenged the NFL’s
anticompetitive labor market rules.77 The players association also bargained over
Yesterday we had a hearing in the automobile industry and it came out very clearly
that the company union was formed by sending to each worker a constitution and
bylaws telling him, ‘This is now your organization.’ As the result of that an
election was held, and the workers testified that they voted because they knew
very well if they did not vote their jobs were gone.
Nat’l Lab. Bd. Hearing, supra note 70, at 110.
72
Senator Robert Wagner‘s vision when he introduced the bill that eventually became
the NLRA:
The law has long refused to recognize contracts secured through physical
compulsion or duress. The actualities of present-day life impel us to recognize
economic duress as well. We are forced to recognize the futility of pretending that
there is equality of freedom when a single workman, with only his job between
his family and ruin, sits down to draw a contract of employment with a
representative of a tremendous organization having thousands of workers at its
call. Thus the right to bargain collectively, guaranteed to labor by section 7(a) of
the Recovery Act, is a veritable charter of freedom of contract; without it there
would be slavery by contract.
See 78 Cong. Rec. S3678–20 (daily ed. March 5, 1934) (statement by Sen. Robert Wagner).
73
Id.
74
Section 7 of the Act provides: “Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2019).
75
DEP’T. OF LAB., BUREAU LAB. STATS., BULL. NO. 2070, HANDBOOK OF LAB. STAT.
412 tbl. 165, col. 7 (1980).
76
Baseball was the first sport to enter into collective bargaining. See Marvin Miller:
Founding Executive Director, 1966–1982, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS,
https://www.mlbplayers.com/marvin-miller [https://perma.cc/Y3VP-B6UD] (last visited
July 9, 2021) (“In 1968, Miller led a committee of players that negotiated the first collective
bargaining agreement in the history of professional sports.”).
77
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 620–21 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that the “Rozelle
Rule”—which required a team acquiring a free-agent to compensate the former team—
constituted an anti-trust violation under the Sherman Act). The opinion also noted that
football players entered into formal labor agreements, the first ran from July 15, 1968, to
February 1, 1970. Id. at 610.
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other issues, including a player’s right to file a grievance related to their injuries.78
When a Minnesota Vikings offensive lineman, Korey Stringer, died from heatrelated medical conditions in training camp in 2001,79 the NFL and NFLPA labor
agreement had several provisions concerning player safety.80 Another lawsuit, filed
by retired players in 2011, alleged that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
did not address the NFL’s duty to warn players about the long-term effects of
concussions.81 Players eventually settled for a brain-injury fund valued at $1
billion.82 When the NFL and players association negotiated a new CBA in 2020,
their contracts included many provisions for player safety and medical care.83 A
short time later, they bargained for an addendum regarding COVID-19 protocols.84

78

NFL Mgmt. Council v. Superior Ct., 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (describing a player’s
use of an “injury grievance” provision under the collective bargaining agreement between
the NFL Players Association and the management council).
79
Stringer v. NFL, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 898 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (bringing a wrongful
death action against the NFL, Minnesota Vikings, and Riddell, an equipment maker). A key
part of this case against the NFL related to the league’s hot weather guidelines and protocols
for treating heat-related illnesses, which the plaintiff argued were negligent and not covered
by the CBA to avoid preemption issues. Id. at 904–05, 907. The court ruled that several
claims against the NFL and Riddell were not preempted by section 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Act because the labor agreement did not relate to those matters, and
denied motions to dismiss these claims. Id. at 915.
80
Id. at 905–06 (referencing Art. XIII, § 1(a) of the CBA) (discussing a player’s right
to medical treatment and describing a Joint Committee on Player Safety and Welfare “to
discuss player safety and welfare aspects of playing equipment, playing surfaces, stadium
facilities, playing rules, [and] player-coach relationships”).
81
In re NFL Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 421–22 (3d Cir. 2016).
82
Id. at 440, 444 (affirming settlement which “provide[s] nearly $1 billion in value to
the class of retired players”).
83
NFLPA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 213 (2020), https://nflpaweb.blob.
core.windows.net/website/PDFs/CBA/March-15-2020-NFL-NFLPA-Collective-Bargaining
-Agreement-Final-Executed-Copy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8SC-6J4S]. Article 39 contains
more than twenty sections, including: Physicians, Trainers, the NFLPA’s Medical Director,
Emergency Action Plan, Accountability and Care Committee, Player’s Right to a Second
Medical Opinion, Player’s Right to a Surgeon of His Choice, Preseason Physical, Substance
Abuse and Performance-Enhancing Substances, Visiting Team Locker Rooms, Field Surface
Safety & Performance Committee, Joint Engineering, and Equipment Safety Committee,
Sleep Studies, Club-Wide Biospecimen Collection, Head, Neck, and Spine Committee’s
Concussion Diagnosis and Management Protocol, Game Concussion Protocol Enforcement,
Player Scientific and Medical Research Protocol, Behavioral Health Program, Prescription
Medication and Pain Management Program, and Remedies. Id. at i–xv.
84
The main provisions of this lengthy agreement are discussed infra, in Part IV.
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C. NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committees: A Company Union for College
Players
The NCAA provides college players with representation that resembles
company unions in the 1930s. The NCAA adopted this controlled form of
participation by establishing Student-Athlete Advisory Committees (SAACs) in
1989.85 Like company unions, the NCAA gave SAACs limited functions. SAACs
were “formed primarily to review and offer student-athlete input on NCAA activities
and proposed legislation that affected student-athlete welfare.”86 SAACs have no
actual power or defined authority. Instead, they “[g]enerate a student-athlete voice
within the NCAA structure,” “[s]olicit student-athlete response to proposed NCAA
legislation,” “[r]ecommend potential NCAA legislation,” “[r]eview, react and
comment to the governance structure on legislation, activities and subjects of
interest,” “[a]ctively participate in the administrative process of athletics programs
and the NCAA,” and “[p]romote a positive student-athlete image.”87 Minutes of the
quarterly meetings of the Division I SAAC reveal the group’s absence in developing
COVID-19 safety policies.88
85

NCAA, NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, (1989) http://www.ncaapublic
ations.com/productdownloads/SAAC02.pdf [https://perma.cc/47A6-YXJM].
86
Id.
87
NCAA, NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committees (SAACs), http://www.ncaa.org/
student-athletes/ncaa-student-athlete-advisory-committees-saacs#:~:text=Each%20committ
ee%20is%20made%20up,%2Dathletes'%20lives%20on%20campus [https://perma.cc/KW
C5-UKP9] (last visited July 18, 2021).
88
NCAA, Report of the NCAA Division I Student-Athlete Advisory Committee (Apr.
22, 2020), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/committees/d1/saac/Apr2020D1SAAC_
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVL9-MRKV] (listing no action items on the agenda and only
informational points, including an update from the NCAA research staff on the NCAA
Student-Athlete COVID-19 Well-Being Survey). By mid-summer, as football programs
began workouts, some schools required players to sign COVID-related waivers. See, e.g.,
Ross Dellenger, Coronavirus Liability Waivers Raise Questions as College Athletes Return
to Campus, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 17, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/06/17/
college-athletes-coronavirus-waivers-ohio-state-smu
[https://perma.cc/HH9U-JSKH]
(reporting that returning athletes, “without legal representation, are agreeing to waive their
legal rights”). However, when SAAC met on July 17, 2020, in a videoconference, and
developed priorities for the 2020–21 year, they barely discussed COVID-19. In Point 8,
during the discussion part of the meeting for conference reports, COVID-19 was mentioned
only once, and it was framed with other items, including social justice and mental health
concerns for student-athletes. NCAA, Report of the NCAA Division I Student-Athlete
Advisory Committee (July 17, 2020), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/committees/d1/sa
ac/July2020D1SAAC_Report.pdf. [https://perma.cc/GC9F-G2XJ]. SAAC held a meeting in
mid-August and “provided feedback related to the 2020 fall playing season and agreed that
student-athletes need clear guidance before the Division can adopt a comprehensive playing
season model for the remainder of the fall.” NCAA, Report of the NCAA Division I StudentAthlete Advisory Committee (Aug. 18, 2020), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/commit
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The bylaws of a campus-level SAAC confirm that these groups function like
company unions. Northwestern University—the school involved in the most serious
effort by football players to form a union under the NLRA89—has a SAAC.90
However, the campus SAAC does not post its bylaws on a public access website.
Stanford University also has a SAAC, and like Northwestern, its football team plays
in a Power 5 Conference. Unlike Northwestern, Stanford’s SAAC publishes its
bylaws.91 However, the group’s modest advisory functions fall short of bargaining
over wages, hours of practice, and other conditions of their athletic participation.92
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
A. Research Design: A Natural Experiment
When the COVID-19 pandemic escalated in March 2020, the impact on
professional and NCAA sports was abrupt and severe, with shutdowns occurring
between March 11–12.93 Football was the best positioned of team sports to adjust to
tees/d1/saac/Aug2020D1SAAC_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DDT9-YSE5]. Nothing in the
minutes specifically referenced COVID-19. In October, SAAC discussed COVID-19 in the
limited context of reviewing a draft policy, “Competition Waivers and Extensions of
Eligibility for Winter and Spring Sport Student-Athletes.” NCAA, Report of the NCAA
Division I Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, (Oct. 22, 2020), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazon
aws.com/committees/d1/saac/Oct2020D1SAAC_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MSZ77BFJ]. This dealt with player eligibility, not safety related to COVID-19.
89
See Nw. Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (2015).
90
Nw. Univ., Student-Athlete Advisory Committee (SAAC), NW. ATHLETICS (2021),
https://nusports.com/sports/2015/3/18/GEN_2014010134.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9K4QGP4C] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
91
Stanford Univ., Stanford SAAC, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YG8_gQ6Q
nuvXfMctyfTLYoT_GT0jBaL6yx89X2XJTNY/edit?ts=5bede5cc#heading=h.w9jwwqv8m
2c0 [https://perma.cc/Y3GJ-4V42] (last visited July 9, 2021).
92
Id. at Art. II. Mission. The Stanford University Student-Athlete Advisory Committee
mission states:
Goals and Commitments of SAAC are to help student-athletes:
•
Achieve elite-level athletic performance
•
Achieve academic excellence
•
Participate in community service
•
Foster lasting relationships with alumni and faculty
•
Develop leadership skills
Stanford Univ., supra note 91, at Art. II.
93
Scott Cacciola & Sopan Deb, N.B.A. Suspends Season After Player Tests Positive for
Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/sports/bas
ketball/nba-season-suspended-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/D5TN-B84Z] (reporting
that the NBA abruptly canceled games and suspended the season due to the first player

2021]

COVID-19 PROTOCOLS

1043

the pandemic because the first wave of lockdowns occurred near the start of their
off-seasons.94 The NFL and NCAA had approximately five months to decide
whether to play a 2020 season and what safety protocols to use.
My research design utilizes a natural experiment. A sports economics study,
“A Natural Experiment to Determine the Crowd Effect Upon Home Court
Advantage,”95 offers a model for this design. In the study, the researchers tested for
the independent effect of a supportive crowd on a team’s performance. From 1999–
2014, the Los Angeles Clippers and Los Angeles Lakers shared the same home
facility, the Staples Center.96 They also played four games against each other in this
arena, alternating as home and away teams.97 As a home team, each team filled the
arena with its fans. This provided a natural experiment, allowing researchers to
measure the independent effect of a sympathetic home crowd on team performance.
The Clippers won 13 of 30 games (43.3%) against the Lakers when designated as
the home team, compared to winning 7 of 29 games (24.1%) as the visitors.98 In
other words, the home crowd correlated with winning more games.99
Professional and college football are sufficiently similar to offer a natural
experiment to determine whether collective bargaining has an independent effect on
player health protocols. Their games are on the same length and type of field, eleven
players are on offense, eleven players are on defense, a line of scrimmage is used to
testing positive for COVID-19); Greta Anderson, Coronavirus Looms Over March Madness,
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/03/05/firstncaa-games-canceled-due-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/2Y8H-6UVF] (stating that two
colleges canceled basketball games due to COVID-19 outbreak on West Coast, putting
March Madness tournament at risk); NHL to Pause Season Due to Coronavirus, NHL (Mar.
11, 2020), https://www.nhl.com/news/nhl-coronavirus-to-provide-update-on-concerns/c316131734 [https://perma.cc/23WM-MXGZ] (declaring that hockey season paused until
further notice); Jabari Young, MLB Will Delay Opening Day by at Least Two Weeks, Spring
Training Canceled Due to Coronavirus, CNBC (Mar. 12, 2020, 4:41PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/12/mlb-to-suspend-all-operations-spring-training-due-tocoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/YMR4-VFU7].
94
Ken Belson, N.F.L. Players Vote Yes on New 10-Year Labor Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/sports/football/nfl-cba-approved.html
[ttps://perma.cc/3H9A-TGGX] (reporting that the NFLPA approved a new, ten-year
collective bargaining agreement by a slim majority). While other pro and college sports
postponed or canceled games, the NFL experienced a more muted impact: “Given the
limitations on travel because of the risk of spreading coronavirus, teams will have to evaluate
players by telephone or video conference. This includes college players that teams want to
speak with before the draft, which is currently set to begin on April 23.” Id.
95
See generally Christopher J. Boudreaux, Shane D. Sanders & Bhavneet Walia, A
Natural Experiment to Determine the Crowd Effect Upon Home Court Advantage, 18 J.
SPORTS ECON. 737 (2017).
96
Id. at 740.
97
Id. (reporting that the teams played each other four times per season—except for the
2011 season, which had a lockout—with each team serving as the home team in two games).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 746.
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start most plays—bringing many players within six feet of each other—offensive
and defensive positions are the same, and games are played in four fifteen-minute
quarters that yield an hour of competition. The close similarity is borne out by the
fact that the NFL’s labor market is drawn almost entirely from the NCAA.100 More
than 80% of rookie players drafted by an NFL team in 2020 made an NFL roster,
underscoring the close similarity of playing conditions in college and pro football.101
The racial compositions of NFL and NCAA Power 5 rosters are also similar.102
In 2019, Division I football had 3,671 Black players (46.1% of the total for all
teams), 2,935 (36.9%) white players, and 1,355 “Other” race players (17%).103 In
2016, an analysis of pro football rosters concluded that the “NFL as a whole is about
68% black, although that number could be a couple [of] percent higher from the
unknowns. Black and Pacific Islander players are hugely overrepresented compared
to the American population, while all other races are heavily underrepresented.”104
These statistics—apart from indicating similar compositions by race—also suggest
that NCAA and NFL players should have especially stringent safety conditions
because Black and other non-white people are more at risk for COVID-19
infections105 and death.106
100

See Scott Kacsmar, Where Does NFL Talent Come From?, BLEACHER REP’T (May
16, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1641528-where-does-nfl-talent-come-from
[https://perma.cc/P4EW-B787] (analyzing rosters from the 2012 season, including practice
squads, from Pro-Football-Reference for all teams, a total of 1,947 players attended 256
different colleges; the study reports that only “seven players did not go to a college in the
United States”).
101
Rick Gosselin, Could the 2020 NFL Draft Be One of the Greatest?, FANNATION,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.si.com/nfl/talkoffame/nfl/2020-nfldraft-produced-a-record-number-of-players-and-starters [https://perma.cc/6ACW-U9PA]
(“Of the 255 players selected last April, a record 209 of them made opening-day rosters.
That’s a success rate of 81.9 percent, another record for drafts.”).
102
See Michael Gertz, NFL Census 2016, PROFOOTBALLLOGIC (Apr. 19, 2017),
http://www.profootballlogic.com/articles/nfl-census-2016/ [https://perma.cc/JH5S-N3XZ];
see also Diversity Research: NCAA Race and Gender Demographics Database, NCAA,
[hereinafter NCAA] https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/diversity-research
[https://perma.cc/M2CQ-DV6T] (last visited July 19, 2021).
103
NCAA, supra note 102.
104
Gertz, supra note 102.
105
See Shirley Sze, Daniel Pan, Clareece R. Nevill, Laura J. Gray, Christopher A.
Martin, Joshua Nazareth, Jatinder S. Minhas, Pip Divall, Kamlesh Khunti, Keith R. Abrams,
Laura B. Nellums & Manish Pareek, Ethnicity and Clinical Outcomes in COVID-19: A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, LANCET, ECLINICAL MED. (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/eclinm/article/PIIS2589-5370(20)30374-6/fulltext
[https://perma.cc/2X9P-XX54] (finding an analysis of 18,728,893 patients from 50 studies
showed that Black and Asian patients had a higher risk of COVID-19 infection compared to
white patients).
106
See Michael Doumas, Dimitrios Patoulias, Alexandra Katsimardou, Konstantinos
Stavropoulos, Konstantinos Imprialos & Asterios Karagiannis, COVID19 and Increased
Mortality in African Americans: Socioeconomic Differences or Does the Renin Angiotensin
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In sum, many important variables were essentially constant across the NFL and
NCAA Power 5 football platforms for the pandemic season of 2020. One significant
difference, however, was the process for implementing safety protocols related to
practices and games. In the fall of 2020, the NFL and NFLPA agreed to a seventytwo-page addendum that addressed COVID-19 protocols.107 In contrast, the NCAA
had no players association, its SAAC played no role in co-determining COVID-19
safety policies,108 and even the Power 5 conferences had chaotic and disjointed
responses to resuming the 2020 season.109 These disparate conditions for the NFL
and Power 5 football created a natural experiment to compare whether collective
bargaining produced worse, the same, or better safety protocols as opposed to a
nonunion process.
This was not an ideal natural experiment because factors other than collective
bargaining probably led to differences in COVID-19 protocols. The NFL’s protocols
reportedly cost teams $40 million.110 Cost data for NCAA football COVID-19 safety
protocols were not reported but were probably less due to athletic budgets that
strained to support non-revenue sports.111
System Also Contribute?, 34 J. HUM. HYPERTENSION 764 (July 15, 2020) (“AfricanAmericans suffer from a 2.4 and 2.2 times higher mortality rate when compared to [w]hites
and Asians or Latinos, respectively.”).
107
See ADDENDUM, supra note 1.
108
See id. (providing no indication that the NCAA was involved in determining
COVID-19 policies for the NFL); see also supra Section II.C.
109
See e.g., Paula Lavigne & Mark Schlabach, Nearly Half of Power 5 Won’t Disclose
COVID-19 Test Data, ESPN (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.espn.com/collegesports/story/_/id/29745712/nearly-half-power-5-disclose-covid-19-test-data [https://perma.
cc/3Y2S-TXRH]; Mark Kreidler, Coronavirus Is Placing College Sports on Hold, Putting
Students, University Budgets, and Entire Towns at Risk, TIME (Aug. 3, 2020, 8:00 AM EDT),
https://time.com/5874483/college-football-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/HK9M-RTJU];
Michael Rosenberg, It Took a Pandemic to See the Distorted State of College Sports, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/12/29/global-pandemicexposed-ncaa-inc [https://perma.cc/48W2-TXR4].
110
Gregg Bell & Lauren Kirschman, The Seahawks Are Perfect Against COVID, But
the Huskies Got Crushed — What Happened?, NEWS TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2020) (reporting that
the Seattle Seahawks spent about $40 million on daily PCR “gold standard” COVID-19
testing, at about $30 per test, while the nearby University of Washington spent about $21 to
$23 per test for antigen testing).
111
Id. (reporting that, because NCAA football rosters are larger than those for NFL
teams, the University of Washington routinely administered several dozen more COVID-19
tests than the Seattle Seahawks, driving up costs). The Seahawks also had more financial
backing to administer its COVID-19 program, with annual TV revenue of about $260
million. Id. In contrast, the Washington athletic program—presumably, like other Power 5
schools—faced a large hole in its budget from COVID-19 and had to administer its protocols
in the face of budget cuts. Id. This report did not mention, however, if the University of
Washington paid for some or all COVID-19 testing out of a general campus budget—a
possibility if the general student population was being tested with some regularity. Id. See
also Craig Garthwaite & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, The COVID-19 Pandemic Is Revealing
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Also, NCAA players were students on college campuses. NCAA programs
could not control their social interactions as much as NFL teams could restrict
players. By comparison, once NFL football players left practice- and game-related
activities, they were often subject to strongly normative guidelines to reduce social
interactions.112 Also, unlike the NFL, NCAA football protocols were part of
comprehensive policies for other sports. In sum, these outside factors affected the
natural experiment for assessing an effect for collective bargaining. However, no
outside factor appeared to match the singular difference in the processes that the
NFL and Power 5 schools used to implement COVID-19 safety procedures.
B. Research Methods: Comparing NFL and Collegiate COVID-19 Protocols
On September 5, 2020, the NFL and NFLPA agreed to comprehensive COVID19 protocols. The addendum was posted online. I began by reading the addendum
and breaking out provisions for player safety.113 These fell into six categories and
were subdivided into forty-five points. Based on these points, I created a scorecard
to compare with college protocols.
The start of the college football season was more irregular. Among Power 5
conferences, the Big 10 initially announced that it would significantly delay the start
of its 2020 football season.114 Other conferences went forward with scheduling
games for the regular season. Facing pressure from President Donald Trump115 and

the Regressive Business Model of College Sports, BROOKINGS BROWN CTR. CHALKBOARD
(Oct. 16, 2020) (reporting that low-revenue sports were being eliminated due to budget
strains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic).
112
Some provisions related to non-players, such as travel and media groups.
ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 7 (Tier 2M (pool media) and Tier 3 (facility workers who do
not have close contact with players and coaches)).
113
See infra notes 126–28, 131–33.
114
Bruce Schoenfeld, Was the College Football Season Worth It?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/30/magazine/college-football-pandemic.html
[https://perma.cc/QEX2-UD7W].
115
Allan Smith & Peter Alexander, Trump Takes Victory Lap Over Return of Big Ten
Football. College President Says it Has Nothing to Do with Him, NBCNEWS.COM (Sept. 16,
2020, 5:41 PM MDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-takesvictory-lap-return-big-10-football-college-president-n124 [https://perma.cc/NK7F-95EQ]
(reporting on a late-August tweet by President Trump: “No, I want Big 10, and all other
football, back – NOW”). In a follow-up, President Trump tweeted, “Disgraceful that Big 10
is not playing football. Let them PLAY!” Id.
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coaches116 to put on a football season during the fall, the Big 10 modified its original
decision.117
By the end of September, with a football season in place for Power 5
conferences, I began to identify FOIA and similar open records laws for the fiftythree public schools in these conferences. I expected that the public schools would
respond to my request in whole or in large part because public records laws apply to
state-supported schools. (My survey confirmed this assumption: I received
numerous initial responses to my inquiries referencing a school’s obligations under
a public records law.)118 These laws generally allow public access to a school’s
records, with exceptions.119 I tempered my hope for cooperation from schools when

116

See, e.g., Orion Sang, Michigan Football Coach Jim Harbaugh Attends Protest,
Says ‘Free the Big 10,’ DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 5, 2020, 3:59 PM ET),
https://www.freep.com/story/sports/college/university-michigan/wolverines/2020/09/05/
michigan-football-jim-harbaugh-protest/5730035002/ [https://perma.cc/287B-NA46]; Gabe
Lacques, 20 for 2020: Sports Figures Who Defined Courageous and Kind, Selfish and
Stubborn,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
28,
2020,
12:47
PM
ET),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2020/12/28/2020-year-review-20-sports-figuresdefined-best-and-worst/4015133001/ [https://perma.cc/C4QP-BFL9] (explaining that while
the Big 10 was deliberating whether to play football in 2020, Nebraska Head Coach Scott
Frost suggested that his program would play a non-Big 10 schedule if games were canceled).
117
Schoenfeld, supra note 114.
118
See, e.g., Email from Melissa Tindell, Dir. of Commc’n, Univ. of Tenn. to Michael
H. Leroy, Professor, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law (Oct. 16, 2020) (on file with author) (“[O]nly
citizens of Tennessee may inspect and receive copies of public records under the Tennessee
Public Records Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A). It appears this law would impact
your request for information.”); see also Email from Bob Taylor, Open Records Man., Univ.
of Ga. to Michael H. Leroy, Professor, Univ. of Ill. Col. of Law (on file with author) (Oct.
22, 2020) (“Professor LeRoy—This is to acknowledge receipt of your October 16, 2020,
request for documents under the Georgia Open Records Act, and is in accordance with the
three-day period of response pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71(b)(2).”).
119
See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 140/1-11. The statute’s purpose states:
Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of
government, it is declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that all
persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of
government and the official acts and policies of those who represent them as
public officials and public employees consistent with the terms of this Act. Such
access is necessary to enable the people to fulfill their duties of discussing public
issues fully and freely, making informed political judgments and monitoring
government to ensure that it is being conducted in the public interest.
5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 140/1-11. The law also provides exceptions, stating that it “is not intended
to be used to violate individual privacy, nor for the purpose of furthering a commercial
enterprise, or to disrupt the duly-undertaken work of any public body independent of the
fulfillment of any of the fore-mentioned rights of the people to access . . . information.” Id.
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an investigative report found that college athletic departments concealed
information about COVID-19 infections from their communities.120
Often, I was required to register online with these public universities to request
information. I devised a simple request for COVID-19 policies related to football
players. I avoided questions that would likely be rejected—for example, data on
testing results or player information. I also avoided requests that could be rejected
on the grounds of being burdensome or costly. I sent requests to all fifty-three public
schools and the legal departments of the twelve private schools121 between October
15 and October 30, 2020. My request was the same for every school:
This request is for my research study, “COVID-19 Protocols for NCAA
Football and the NFL.” My survey includes all NCAA Power 5 conference
institutions, including those that are not subject to a FOIA or public
information disclosure law.
I respectfully request policies and procedures at your university relating to
(1) questionnaires, or similar inquiries, for football student-athletes for
COVID-19 symptoms and exposure to the virus; (2) criteria to identify
high-risk football student-athletes, and specialized procedures for them;
(3) screening and testing procedures for football student-athletes; (4)
screening and testing procedures for football student-athletes who test
positive or are symptomatic for COVID-19; (5) criteria to return football
student-athletes who test positive or are symptomatic for COVID-19 to
regular athletic activities; and (6) contact tracing policies and procedures
120

Blinder, Higgins, and Guggenheim states as follows:

At least 6,629 people who play and work in athletic departments that compete in
college football’s premier leagues have contracted the virus; the actual tally of
cases during the pandemic is assuredly far larger than what is shown by The
Times’s count, the most comprehensive public measure of the virus in college
sports.
See Blinder et al., supra note 3; see also id. (stating that the schools not named in the article’s
list, “many of them public institutions, released no statistics or limited information about
their athletic departments, or they stopped providing data just ahead of football season. This
had the effect of drawing a curtain of secrecy around college sports during the gravest public
health crisis in the United States in a century”).
121
Arranged by conferences in 2020, schools included ACC (Clemson, Florida State,
Georgia Tech, Louisville, North Carolina State, North Carolina, Pittsburgh, Virginia,
Virginia Tech); Big 10 (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Michigan State,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio State, Penn State, Purdue, Rutgers, and Wisconsin); Big Twelve
(Iowa State, Kansas, Kansas State, Oklahoma, Oklahoma State, Texas, Texas Tech, and West
Virginia); PAC-12 (Arizona, Arizona State, Cal (California-Berkeley), Colorado, Oregon,
Oregon State, UCLA, Washington, and Washington State); and SEC (Alabama, Arkansas,
Auburn, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, LSU, Mississippi, Mississippi State, Missouri, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas A&M).
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for football student-athletes who test positive or are symptomatic for
COVID-19.
My request is only for football policies and procedures. If this information
is grouped with other sports, I would accept that more general information.
I prefer an email response with a PDF attachment over physical copies of
pages sent by mail. My email address is mhl@illinois.edu.
I am not seeking data or information relating to football student-athletes.
My research will also report institutions that do not participate in this
survey. If you wish to discuss my request, please email me. Thank you for
your time and cooperation.
I tracked responses and non-responses to my requests. The responses I received
sub-divided into fully or mostly complete information, partial information, and too
little information to be usable. Other schools informed me that their state’s FOIA
laws exempted requests from non-residents. Penn State noted that the university is
entirely exempt from all FOIA requests. Some schools delayed their response, often
several times. Other schools—especially private schools—never replied to me.
When a response was sufficient to be considered comprehensive, I tallied points
that matched items on the NFL-NFLPA scorecard. I assigned one point to each
matching item. While some points were probably more important than others in
limiting the spread of medical effects from COVID-19, I had no scientific basis for
assigning different weights to these points.
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
I present the empirical results in three parts. Section IV.A.1 pertains to school
responses and non-responses. In Section IV.A.2, I provide a statistical breakdown
of the usable responses. My scoring compared forty-five specific elements in the
NFL-NFLPA agreement with the policy materials that each school provided me. My
results show that schools scored between ten and thirty points. In Section IV.A.3, I
compare the number of Power 5 and NFL games postponed or canceled due to
COVID-19.
In Section IV.B, I interpret my results. The data have several limitations. I,
therefore, caution against making critical judgments of schools with lower scores. I
also note that as the 2020 football season continued, the NFL and NFLPA revised
their policies. Near the end of the 2020 football season, some Power 5 schools made
changes, too, such as adopting the use of KINEXON tracking technology,122 a
protocol that was absent from the policies in my survey.

122

See, e.g., PAC-12 Sports, PAC-12 to Utilize KINEXON SafeZone for Rapid, Reliable
Tracing, 247 SPORTS (Nov. 30, 2020), https://247sports.com/college/washington/Article/
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A. Survey Responses
1. Sample and Response Rate
Table 1 summarizes responses and non-responses from sixty-five Power 5
schools.
Table 1
Responses to FOIA and Open Records Requests by Power 5 Schools
No Response/Delayed Response (39 Schools)
Responses (26 Schools)
(Numbers in parentheses reflect games postponed or canceled)
No Response

24

Private: Boston College (1), Duke
(2), Miami (4), Notre Dame (1),
Northwestern (1), TCU (0),
Stanford (1), Syracuse (0), USC
(2), Wake Forest (6), Vanderbilt
(4) (21 disrupted games)

(11)

Public: Auburn (1), Florida (2),
Kansas State (0), Mississippi (0),
Wisconsin (3), North Carolina
State (1), Oklahoma (2),
Oklahoma State (1), Oregon State
(0), Purdue (3), South Carolina
(0), Texas Tech (0), Washington
State (3) (16 disrupted games)

(13)

Response Received: School Is
Exempt from Disclosure Law

8

Alabama (2), Arkansas (2), LSU
(3), Penn State (0), Pitt (1),
Tennessee (2), Virginia (4),
Virginia Tech (2) (16 disrupted
games)

Unusable: One Page, Little
Information

3

Michigan State (2), Nebraska
(1), Rutgers (0) (3 disrupted
games)
Unusable: Good Faith
Response with Too Little
Specific Information

4

Baylor (Private) (1), Iowa
State (0), Maryland (4),
Texas A&M (3) (8 disrupted
games)
Usable: Substantial or
Complete Response

19

Arizona State [PAC-12] (3),
Cal-Berkeley [PAC-12] (4),
Clemson [ACC] (1),
Colorado [PAC 12] (2),
Florida State [ACC] (4),
Illinois [Big 10] (0), Indiana
[Big 10] (2), Iowa [Big 10]

Washington-Huskies-UW-Football-Pac-12-to-utilize-KINEXON-SafeZone-for-rapid-andreliable-contact-tracing-155702211/ [https://perma.cc/GRG4-Z25F] [hereinafter PAC-12 to
Utilize KINEXON] (explaining the PAC-12 Conference’s announcement that it would use
KINEXON SafeZone technology to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in its football and
men’s and women’s basketball programs).
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Indefinite Delay
Arizona (2), Georgia (3), Georgia
Tech (3), Louisville (3),
Minnesota (2), Ohio State (2),
UCLA (1) (16 disrupted games)

7
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(1), Kansas [Big 12] (2),
Kentucky [SEC] (0),
Michigan [Big 10] (3),
Mississippi State ($159 Fee)
[SEC] (2), Missouri [SEC]
(5), North Carolina [ACC]
(0), Oregon [PAC 12] (1),
Texas [Big 12] (2), Utah
[PAC 12] (3), Washington
[PAC 12] (4), West Virginia
[Big 12] (2) (41 disrupted
games)

Finding 1: The response rate for the survey was about 30%, a typical figure for
organizational responses to survey research.123
• The response rate, counting only usable replies to the survey request, was
29.2% (nineteen of sixty-five).
• Among the eleven private schools, 90.9% did not respond to this survey.
Baylor, the lone exception, provided a good faith response that was too
incomplete to score.
• The NFL and NFLPA, also private entities that are exempt from FOIA and
Open Records laws, published their complete labor agreement addendum
for COVID-19 protocols.
• Eight public schools (12.3%) stated that they were exempt from providing
information to an out-of-state resident.
• Nine schools (13.8%) asked for one or more extensions in October 2020,
and as of December 31, 2020, had not provided information.
• Three schools provided such limited information that their responses could
not be considered a good faith reply. Two schools sent a cursory list of
COVID-19 symptoms; the other school sent a blank form for a player to
complete with a space for the first and last name and a space for whether
the player tested positive. The schools who sent a blank form for a player
to complete were Michigan State, Nebraska, and Rutgers.
• The nineteen usable responses came from public schools (100%).

123

See Yehuda Baruch & Brooks C. Holtom, Survey Response Rate Levels and Trends
in Organizational Research, 61 HUM. RELS. 1139, 1139 (2008) (stating that analysis of 1,607
studies published from 2000–2005 in seventeen refereed academic journals, and including
more than 100,000 organizations as respondents, found that the average response rate for
studies that used organizational data was 35.7%); see also Brad R. Fulton, Organizations
and Survey Research: Implementing Response Enhancing Strategies and Conducting
Nonresponse Analyses, 47 SOC. METHODS & RSCH. 240, 240 (2018) (stating that for
organizational studies that use key informants as responders, the mean response rate for
published studies is 34%).
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The sampling of usable responses across Power 5 Conferences was fairly
even: ACC (three responses); Big 10 (four responses); Big 12 (three
responses); PAC-12 (six responses); and SEC (three responses).

2. Scoring Power 5 School Responses on an NFL-NFLPA COVID-19 Scorecard
In this section, I present data for various elements of school responses on the
NFL-NFLPA scorecard.
Table 2
Symptom Checklist for College Players
(Total Responses = 19)
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Finding 2: Less than half of the Power 5 schools matched the NFL-NFLPA’s
policies to screen for nine COVID-19 symptoms, meaning that NFL players
were screened more thoroughly than college players.
• NFL-NFLPA symptom list included:
o “1. Loss or diminution of smell or taste 2. Cough 3. Shortness of breath
4. Chest Pain 5. Feeling feverish, chills 6. Muscle pain (not exercise
related) 7. Nausea, vomiting, diarrhea 8. Sinus or cold-like symptoms
(headache, congestion, runny nose, sore throat) 9. Fever (temperature
≥ 100.4 degrees)”124
• Only seven of nineteen schools (36.8%) had a policy for checking player
symptoms that completely matched the NFL-NFLPA agreement: CalBerkeley [PAC-12], Colorado [PAC 12], Illinois [Big 10], Iowa [Big 10],
Michigan [Big 10], North Carolina [ACC], and Oregon [PAC 12].
• Schools in three conferences reported screening policies for player
symptoms that matched the NFL-NFLPA: PAC-12 (three schools), Big 10
(three schools), and ACC (one school). No schools in the Big 12 and SEC
reported a policy of symptom checking that matched the NFL-NFLPA.

124

ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 25.
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Table 3
Policy for Identifying Individual Risk Factors
Total Responses = 19
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Finding 3: Only about one-third of Power 5 schools had a policy for identifying
at least one specific medical risk factor for individuals, and no school matched
the NFL-NFLPA’s guidance for “high-risk” players to curtail most social
interactions.
• The NFL-NFLPA agreement designated “high-risk” individuals as having
any of the following traits: “African American, Hispanic or Pacific
Islander; BMI ≥ 28; Sleep apnea; Hypertension; Altered immunity;
Diabetes mellitus; Cardiac disease.”125
• The NFL-NFLPA agreement treated “high-risk” players the same as
players with COVID-19 symptoms by requiring:
o “i. Home pulse oximeter, if confirmed COVID-19 positive.
o ii. If fever or flu-like symptoms are present and COVID-19 is not
confirmed initially, testing for other viral syndromes such as influenza
and RSV should be considered (i.e., respiratory multiplex viral PCR).
o iii. If initial PCR testing is negative, repeat testing for COVID-19 must
be considered pursuant to the Screening and Testing Protocol.
o iv. Confirmation of another virus does not rule out co-infection with
COVID-19 and re-testing for COVID-19 should be considered if
symptoms persist beyond one week.
o v. Labs and ECG are not recommended in patients being managed as
an outpatient during the acute phase of a COVID-19 illness as
conducting these tests place others at risk when the patient should be
in isolation; however, players will require some cardiovascular
evaluation before a return to exercise.”126

125
126

Id. at 1.
Id. at 26–27.
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The NFL-NFLPA had a broad policy restricting player time at practice
facilities and social interactions (apart from the baseline safety protocols
for all players).127
No Power 5 school had a “high-risk” policy like the policy in the NFLNFLPA agreement that specifically designated a player’s race.
Only six out of nineteen schools (31.6%) had a “high-risk” policy
specifically for individuals with an immune or cardiac condition; only five
schools (26.3%) had a policy for diabetes; only four schools (21.1%) had a
policy for hypertension, and only one school (5.3%) had a policy for
obesity.
Even for the few schools that identified individual risk factors associated
with COVID-19 infection, none had comprehensive social limitations and
enhanced testing like the NFL-NFLPA agreement’s “high-risk” player
protection policies.

Id. at 69 (emphasis added)

COVID-19 can cause symptoms ranging from mild to severe. According to the
CDC, some individuals may be more likely to suffer severe illness as a result of
COVID-19 than others due to the presence of certain characteristics or medical
conditions. It is the responsibility of each Head Team Physician to identify any
player that may be a High Risk Individual, and he or she must review each player’s
individual medical history in light of the current CDC guidance regarding
individuals with increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19. Clubs should
educate their High Risk players and players in close contact or residing with High
Risk Individuals on steps they can take to help further protect themselves, such
as: staying home to the extent possible, and limiting time at Club facilities to
only “essential” time; avoiding close contact with others, especially crowds,
communal spaces, and anyone who is sick; closely monitoring and managing
physical and mental health at all times, and notifying the Team Physician of
any change in health status; speaking to a Team Physician about whether all
vaccinations are up to date, including the flu vaccine; continuing to take
medications as recommended by the High Risk Individual’s treating
physician, and maintaining at least a two-week supply of any necessary
prescription and nonprescription medications at all times; and reviewing the
CDC’s Guidance for extra precautions for reducing risk for High Risk
Individuals, as set forth in the NFL-NFLPA Education Protocol. Each Club is
responsible for identifying and implementing additional measures to reduce High
Risk Individuals’ risk of exposure to COVID-19 while in the club facilities.
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Table 4
Frequency of COVID-19 Symptom Screening and Testing for
Players
Total Responses = 19
15
10

10

10

Daily COVID
Symptom

Daily COVID Test

9

9

5
0
Unspecified
Unspecified
Frequency COVID Frequency COVID
Symptom
Test

Finding 4: While the NFL-NFLPA’s COVID-19 protocols required daily
symptom and COVID-19 testing of all players, only about half of Power 5
schools explicitly required the same testing policies for symptoms and
infections.
• The NFL-NFLPA agreement had a rigorous policy of daily screening and
testing, providing: “Screening: All players, Club employees and
contractors who have access to the Restricted Areas must undergo daily
screening and testing prior to entering the facility pursuant to the Screening
and Testing Protocol.”128
• All Power 5 schools had policies for periodic symptom screening and
COVID-19 testing; however, only ten out of nineteen schools (52.6%) had
explicit policies to screen and test players at least six days per week.

128

Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
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Table 5
Player Expossure to Symptomatic Contacts
and Quarantine for Confirmed COVID-19 Infections
Total Responses = 19
15
10

5

5

1

2

0
Exposure Only: Isolate
Until Negative Test

Exposure Only: Eight Day
Daily Home Pulse
Repeat PCR Testing
Oximeter for High Risk or
Positive

Finding 5: Power 5 schools had fewer policies for player exposure to COVID19/quarantine due to a COVID-19 positive test, compared to the NFL-NFLPA’s
addendum.
• The NFL-NFLPA agreement had a rigorous policy for isolating and testing
players who were exposed to people with COVID-19: “If virus test is
negative and Close Contact remains asymptomatic: Close Contact may
return to Club Facility subject to the following: Increased symptom
monitoring; Daily PCR Virus Testing: Days 1–8; Regular testing schedule
thereafter.”129
• The NFL-NFLPA agreement had a rigorous policy for quarantining and
testing a player who tested positive for COVID-19: “If virus test is positive
. . . and individual is symptomatic: No return unless and until: 1. At least
10 days have passed since first COVID symptoms appeared; and 2. At least
24 hours have passed since last fever without the use of fever-reducing
medications; and 3. Other symptoms (e.g., cough, shortness of breath) have
improved; and 4. Return approved by the Club physician, after consultation
with ICS and notification of NFL Chief Medical Officer . . . .”130
• The NFL-NFLPA Agreement also provided: “The following additional
testing for NFL Players who are High Risk . . . or have COVID-19
symptoms are required: i. Home pulse oximeter, if confirmed COVID-19
positive. ii. If fever or flu-like symptoms are present and COVID-19 is not
confirmed initially, testing for other viral syndromes such as influenza and
RSV should be considered (i.e., respiratory multiplex viral PCR). . . .”131

129

Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).
ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 36.
131
Id. at 26.
130
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All Power 5 schools had weaker policies, compared to the NFL-NFLPA
agreement, for players exposed to people who tested positive for, or were
exposed to people with, COVID-19:
o For exposure-only cases, only five schools (26.3%) had policies
requiring isolation until the player had a negative test; and only one
school (5.3%) had a policy for PCR testing for eight consecutive days.
o For COVID-19 positive players, only two schools (10.5%) had policies
for at-home monitoring of a player’s oxygen levels.
Table 6
Cardiac Policy and Testing for COVID-19 Positive Players
Total Responses = 19
15

15

16

15

15

ECG Testing

Left Ventricle
Testing

10
5
0
Cardiac Testing
Policy

Troponin Testing

Finding 6: Most Power 5 schools had similar cardiac testing protocols to those
in the NFL-NFLPA’s COVID-19 agreement.
• The NFL-NFLPA agreement had a rigorous policy for isolating and testing
players who were exposed to COVID-19 or related symptoms: “Any player
who (i) tests positive for COVID-19 (by PCR or antibody test), (ii) is
presumed COVID-19 positive, or (iii) has any cardiopulmonary symptoms
(e.g., shortness of breath, chest pain, tachycardia), is required to undergo
the following testing prior to returning to participation: 1. High-sensitivity
troponin testing (or troponin I or T if high sensitivity troponin); 2. Standard
12-lead electrocardiogram (ECG); and 3. Two-dimensional resting
echocardiogram to assess left ventricular function.”132
• Most Power 5 schools had cardiac testing requirements for COVID-19
positive players.
o For the three or four schools that did not score on any of these
dimensions, they gave discretion to a team physician to conduct cardiac
testing. Physicians may have used discretion in many or all cases to
test players for cardiac problems.

132

Id. at 34–35.
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Fifteen schools (78.9%) required cardiac testing for COVID-19
players, ECG testing, and left-ventricle function testing. Sixteen
schools (84.2%) required a troponin blood test screen for cardiac
problems.
Table 7
Returning COVID-19 Positive Players to Regular Activity
Total Responses = 19
17

15
10

10

7

7

No Fever 24
Hour

Symptom
Improvement

6

5
0
10 Day +
Quarantine

Physician
Approves

Local Health

Finding 7: Nearly all Power 5 schools had the same ten-day minimum
quarantining requirement for players who tested positive for COVID-19, but
only one-third of the schools also matched the specific medical-improvement
criteria in the NFL-NFLPA’s COVID-19 agreement.
• The NFL-NFLPA agreement required a player who tested positive for
COVID-19 and who had symptoms to isolate and meet all five of the
following conditions to resume regular activity: “Individual Tests Positive
for COVID-19 and is Symptomatic. Isolate as soon as possible. No return
unless and until: 1. At least 10 days have passed since first COVID
symptoms appeared; and 2. At least 24 hours have passed since last fever
without the use of fever-reducing medications; and 3. Other symptoms
(e.g., cough, shortness of breath) have improved; and 4. Return approved
by the Club physician, after consultation with ICS and notification of NFL
Chief Medical Officer; and 5. Local regulations and requirements are
satisfied.”133
• Seventeen Power 5 schools (89.5%) matched the NFL-NFLPA Agreement
policy that required COVID-19 positive players with symptoms to
quarantine for ten days.
• Only seven schools required a player in quarantine to be fever-free without
medication for twenty-four hours and symptom improvement (36.8%), and
only six schools (31.6%) required a physician to release a player from
quarantine.
133

Id. at 38.
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Table 8
COVID-19 Contact Tracing Procedures
Total Responses = 19
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Finding 8: Power 5 schools completely lacked KINEXON tracking technology
for contact tracing, and only about one-fourth of the schools reported contact
tracing policies to test people who were exposed to a player who tested positive
to COVID-19.134
• The NFL-NFLPA agreement required a player who tested positive for
COVID-19 or who had symptoms to isolate and meet all five of the
following conditions to resume regular activity: “i. Conduct a contact
tracing investigation to identify all other Club employees, contractors
and/or players, including at other Clubs, who had Close Contact with the
infected individual; 1. Contact tracing to determine Close Contact
exposures in-game will be conducted using Kinexon tracking devices. 2.
Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 2M and Tier 3 Individuals will also be required to wear
Kinexon Proximity Recording tracking devices at all times while engaged
in team activities (including in the Club facility, during practices, and
during team travel). Such devices will only be used to determine Close
Contact exposures during team activities. The data and information
collected from the Proximity Recording tracking devices shall not be
shared with or used by the Club or any third party for any purpose other
than evaluating Close Contact exposures and evaluating efficacy and
compliance with the NFL-NFLPA COVID-19 Protocols. ii. Notify those
134

Bell & Kirschman, supra note 110 (“Unlike the Seahawks, the Huskies go back to
their dorms or shared houses and apartments, in close quarters with fellow students who’ve
done who knows what with whom that day, week and month. College students don’t wear
contact tracers.”).
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individuals of their potential exposure and probable need for quarantine or
isolation pending the results of testing; iii. Arrange for those individuals to
be tested; and iv. Notify the proper health authorities as required by the
applicable local regulation/law.”135
About half of the Power 5 schools (57.9%) stated a specific contact tracing
policy.
Less than half of the Power 5 schools reported a contact tracing policy that
required notification of players exposed to another player who tested
positive for COVID-19 (36.9%) and required testing of the exposed player
(26.3%).

Percentage of Schools

Table 9
Sequence of COVID-19 Protocols for Symptom Screening,
Oxygen Monitoring, Cardiac Testing, and KINEXON Contact
Tracing
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

79%

36%
11%
0%
NFLNFLPA 9Symptom
Screening

NFLNFLPA
Home
Oxygen
Test for
Positive
Player

NFLNFLPA 4Element
Cardiac
Testing

NFLNFLPA
KINEXON
Contact
Tracing

Finding 9: A sequence for COVID-19 policies, starting with symptom
screening—including home-based oxygen monitoring, cardiac testing, and
contact tracing—shows that schools significantly trailed NFL protocols at key
milestones for disease mitigation and treatment.
• At the front-end of a school’s policy, only 36% of schools regularly
screened for nine COVID-19 symptoms listed in the NFL-NFLPA
agreement.
• Only 11% of schools had home oxygen testing and monitoring of COVID19 positive players, as provided in the NFL-NFLPA agreement.
135

ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 42–43 (emphasis added).

2021]
•
•

COVID-19 PROTOCOLS

1061

Most schools (79%) had the same or similar cardiac testing protocols as the
NFL-NFLPA agreement for COVID-19 positive players.
No schools reported using KINEXON location tracking technology for use
in contact tracing as provided in the NFL-NFLPA agreement.
Table 10
Scorecard of College COVID-19 Protocols that Matched
NFL-NFLPA Addendum (Schools Grouped by Conference)
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Finding 10: Median scores for teams varied substantially by conferences, with
the Big 10 and PAC-12 registering the highest COVID-19 policy scores (median
scores, respectively, twenty points and nineteen points) and the SEC registering
the lowest (median score ten points).
• The variances in scores across conferences were consistent with the SEC’s
relatively rushed approach to play football and the Big 10’s and PAC-12’s
delayed start.
• The variances of team scores within all five conferences suggested that
some schools adopted more rigorous COVID-19 safety policies, or other
schools did not conform to conference standards.
• Four schools stood out for COVID-19 policies that approximated standards
in the NFL: Illinois (thirty points), Colorado (twenty-seven and a half
points), Cal (twenty-seven points), and Texas (twenty-seven points).
In sum, a consistent pattern emerged in Finding 2 through Finding 10, showing
that Power 5 schools had less comprehensive and less rigorous COVID-19 testing,
mitigation, treatment, return to activity, and contact tracing policies compared to the
NFL. Viewed as a whole, the data suggest that collectively bargained player safety
policies in the NFL were better than those that schools and conferences unilaterally
implemented. Thus, the natural experiment produced by the sudden and severe
outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic provides evidence that college players could
have benefitted from being treated as employees who could form a union to negotiate
safer protocols and policies.
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3. Comparing Scheduling Disruptions Due to COVID-19 Among Power 5 Schools
and NFL Teams
The data presented in Table 11 derive from news reports that tabulated game
postponements and cancellations in college football and the NFL. The news
reporting for college football games included all teams, incorporating those not in a
Power 5 Conference. For Table 11, I used only games where both teams were Power
5 schools.
Table 11
NFL and Power 5 Games Postponed or Canceled Due to COVID19 (Week 1 – Week 15)
Power 5 Schools
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Linear (NFL)
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Finding 11: Power 5 football games were postponed or canceled twice as often
as NFL games.
• At least sixty-one games involving only Power 5 teams as home and
visiting teams were postponed or canceled due to COVID-19 concerns
during the 2020 football season.136 With 122 teams affected by game
136

David Cobb, Ben Kercheval & Barrett Sallee, College Football Sees 139 Games
Canceled or Postponed During 2020 Regular Season Due to COVID-19 Issues, CBSSPORTS
(Oct. 16, 2020, 12:21 PM ET), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/collegefootball-sees-139-games-canceled-or-postponed-during-2020-regular-season-due-to-covid19-issues/ [https://perma.cc/937K-RZLD] (listing college football games that were affected
during the 2020 regular season). I reduced the list to games involving only Power 5 schools
as home and visiting teams, and found that sixty-two games were canceled or postponed: NC
State at Virginia Tech (Sept. 11), Virginia at Virginia Tech (Sept. 19), Notre Dame at Wake
Forest (Sept. 27), Oklahoma State at Baylor (Oct. 17), Vanderbilt at Missouri (Oct. 17), LSU
at Florida (Oct. 17), Missouri at Florida (Oct. 24), Wisconsin at Nebraska (Oct. 31), Purdue
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disruptions, averaging the data reveals that the sixty-five-member Power 5
conferences experienced roughly two game disruptions per school during
the season.
At least sixteen NFL games were postponed or canceled due to COVID-19
concerns during the 2020 football season. With thirty-two teams affected
by game disruptions, averaging the data reveals that the NFL experienced
roughly one game disruption per team during the season.137

In sum, Table 11 provides evidence about the overall effectiveness of COVID19 protocols in NFL and Power 5 football. College teams experienced about twice
as many game disruptions as the NFL teams. This finding is consistent with data in
Finding 2 through Finding 10 that report shortcomings in the nonunion college
football protocols compared to the collectively bargained protocols in the NFL.
at Wisconsin (Nov. 7), Louisville at Virginia (Nov. 7), Washington at California (Nov. 7),
Arizona at Utah (Nov. 7), Auburn at Mississippi State (Nov. 14), Texas A&M at Tennessee
(Nov. 14), Alabama at LSU (Nov. 14), Georgia at Missouri (Nov. 14), Ohio State at
Maryland (Nov. 14), Pitt at Georgia Tech (Nov. 14), Cal at Arizona State (Nov. 14), Utah at
UCLA (Nov. 14), Arizona State at Colorado (Nov. 21), Ole Miss at Texas A&M (Nov. 21),
Georgia Tech at Miami (Nov. 21), Wake Forest at Duke (Nov. 21), Texas at Kansas (Nov.
21), Michigan State at Maryland (Nov. 21), Washington State at Stanford (Nov. 21),
Clemson at Florida State (Nov. 21), Louisville at Boston College (Nov. 27), Washington at
Washington State (Nov. 27), Miami at Wake Forest (Nov. 28), Arkansas at Missouri (Nov.
28), Tennessee at Vanderbilt (Nov. 28), Minnesota at Wisconsin (Nov. 28), Utah at Arizona
State (Nov. 28), Oklahoma at West Virginia (Nov. 28), Colorado at USC (Nov. 28), Virginia
at Florida State (Nov. 28), Wake Forest at Louisville (Dec. 5), Alabama at Arkansas (Dec.
5), Northwestern at Minnesota (Dec. 5), Maryland at Michigan (Dec. 5), Ole Miss at LSU
(Dec. 5), Missouri at Mississippi State (Dec. 5), Miami at Wake Forest (Dec. 5), Florida
State at Duke (Dec. 5), Vanderbilt at Georgia (Dec. 5), Ole Miss at Texas A&M (Dec. 12),
Michigan at Ohio State (Dec. 12), Purdue at Indiana (Dec. 12), Washington at Oregon (Dec.
12), Oklahoma at West Virginia (Dec. 12), Cal at Washington State (Dec. 12), Texas at
Kansas (Dec. 12), Washington at USC (Dec. 18), Purdue at Indiana (Dec. 18), Vanderbilt at
Georgia (Dec. 19), Georgia Tech at Miami (Dec. 19), Arizona at Cal (Dec. 19), Michigan
State at Maryland (Dec. 19), Michigan at Iowa (Dec. 19), and Florida State at Wake Forest
(Dec. 19). Id.
137
Nick Selbe, Which NFL Games Have Been Rescheduled Due to COVID-19?,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.si.com/nfl/2020/10/09/every-gamerescheduled-due-to-covid19-this-season [https://perma.cc/K9TY-JAVA]. Games that were
postponed one day or more through December 7, 2020, include: Week 4 (Pittsburgh Steelers
at Tennessee Titans and New England Patriots at Kansas City Chiefs), Week 5 (Buffalo Bills
at Tennessee Titans), Week 6 (Kansas City Chiefs at Buffalo Bills, Denver Broncos at New
England Patriots, and New York Jets at Miami Dolphins), Week 7 (Pittsburgh Steelers at
Baltimore Ravens and Jacksonville Jaguars at Los Angeles Chargers), Week 8 (Los Angeles
Chargers at Denver Broncos), Week 10 (Los Angeles Chargers at Miami Dolphins), Week
11 (Denver Broncos at Miami Dolphins and New York Jets at Los Angeles Chargers), Week
12 (Baltimore Ravens at Pittsburgh Steelers), and Week 13 (Dallas Cowboys at Baltimore
Ravens, Washington Football Team at Pittsburgh Steelers, and Buffalo Bills at San Francisco
49ers).
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B. Interpreting Data with Caveats and Limitations
This study’s methodology and findings have several limitations. For clarity, I
enumerate them in a format that is similar to the data findings.
1) Schools responded to my survey request with varying degrees of openness
and cooperation, as well as reluctance. To repeat part of Finding 1, three schools
provided enough information to close my FOIA request without rejecting it but
offered almost no information about COVID-19 safety protocols.
However, other schools used my inquiry to publicize their protocols. Two
schools that replied to my standard FOIA request openly copied people in the
university president’s office who appeared to be senior staff members. These replies
suggested that the presidents of these schools viewed COVID-19 testing protocols
in football as an important matter. These replies may have signified that these
schools had robust accountability from their athletic departments to campus leaders.
2) Schools may have updated their policies after responding to my request in
mid-October, just as the NFL and NFLPA updated their protocols in October
2020.138 My findings compared pro and college football COVID-19 policies at or
near the start of their seasons. Policy revisions after my requests in mid-October
were not part of my findings.
3) Survey responses provided data about policies but not practices. More
rigorous practices may have been implemented apart from the policies. It is also
possible, however, that a school’s practices fell short of their prescribed procedures.
Again, this study compared only COVID-19 football written policies.
4) The Power 5 conferences took varying approaches in their COVID-19
protocols. Unlike the thirty-two NFL teams governed by uniform protocols and
enforced by a powerful league, these sixty-five schools operated under different
rules, perhaps accentuated by regional politics. The Big 10 alone illustrated this
dynamic. University presidents initially voted 11-3 not to proceed with a football
season.139 The fact that any conference promulgated health and safety standards did
not ensure that member schools adopted these policies. In short, while my study
purports to compare NFL and NCAA COVID-19 protocols, my study actually
compares college football policies at nineteen schools spread over five conferences
to one professional league operating under a unified set of rules.
5) My coding of data likely had some degree of inconsistency due to the varying
formats that schools used to communicate their COVID-19 policies. The PDF files
I received ranged from heavily bulleted information presented succinctly in a short
document to a master plan laid out in a densely worded, lengthy document with
minute details. Some schools sent policies piecemeal in several files that sometimes
created confusion. When considering data coding challenges, policies used basic
138
See ADDENDUM, supra note 1; see also NFL and NFLPA COVID-19 Monitoring
Testing
Results,
NAT’L
FOOTBALL
LEAGUE
(Oct.
7,
2020),
https://operations.nfl.com/updates/football-ops/nfl-and-nflpa-covid-19-monitoring-testingresults/ [https://perma.cc/MUZ5-D76D].
139
Schoenfeld, supra note 114.
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terms in slightly different ways that could result in meaningful differences in
administering a player safety program. For example, some policies specified a
temperature for a fever that would be taken at an athletic facility; others used a
player’s self-report of fever; others asked a player if he felt feverish. I coded these
policies the same, even though they could have meant different things.
6) My sample is small. Nonetheless, small samples are occasionally
published,140 including a cardiological study of a small sample of Ohio State players
who tested positive for COVID-19.141 On the other hand, non-responses are more of
a concern: They could reflect bias in how my sample was drawn, omitting schools
with weaker safety protocols. In light of this possibility, I included information in
Table 1, such as conference affiliation and the number of games in which a school
had a postponement or cancellation. I also compared game-disruption numbers to
see if they significantly correlated to non-responding schools. For example, the
twenty-two private and public schools that did not respond to my survey experienced
thirty-eight disrupted games (1.72 disrupted games per school), while the nineteen
schools that provided a usable response had forty-one disrupted games (2.16
disrupted games per school). These differences were not statistically significant.
V. CONCLUSION: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BENEFITS FOOTBALL PLAYERS
The COVID-19 pandemic provided a natural experiment to compare whether
collectively bargained and unilaterally implemented safety protocols for football
players would be the same. One would expect roughly equal safety measures
because NFL and Power 5 football games are so similar, and both were tied to large
but disrupted revenue streams.142 One would assume that managerial concern for
player safety would be the same. However, my study showed real differences
between pro and college football. Collectively bargained COVID-19 protocols for
NFL players were superior to the unilaterally imposed COVID-19 protocols for
college football players. This is the main conclusion of my study. As I now explain,
140

For other research with small samples, see Pamela C. Regan, Saloni Lakhanpal &
Carlos Anguiano, Relationship Outcomes in Indian-American Love-Based and Arranged
Marriages, 110 PSYCH. REPS. 915 (2012) (comparing relationship outcomes in love-based
and arranged marriages in a U.S. sample of fifty-eight Indian participants); Konstantina
Vasileiou, Julie Barnett, Susan Thorpe & Terry Young, Open Access Characterizing and
Justifying Sample Size Sufficiency in Interview-Based Studies: Systematic Analysis of
Qualitative Health Research over a 15-Year Period, 18 BMC MED. RSCH. METHODOLOGY
148 (2018) (justifying small sample size in interview-based studies); Kathleen E. Etz1 &
Judith A. Arroyo, Small Sample Research: Considerations Beyond Statistical Power, 16
SOC’Y FOR PREVENTION RSCH. 1033 (2015) (explaining that small sample research can be
important where serious health concerns arise in vulnerable and underrepresented
populations).
141
Saurabh Rajpal, Matthew S. Tong, James Borchers, Karolina M. Zareba, Timothy
P. Obarski, Orlando P. Simonetti & Curt J. Daniels, Cardiovascular Magnetic Resonance
Findings in Competitive Athletes Recovering from COVID-19 Infection, 6 JAMA
CARDIOLOGY 116 (2021).
142
See Bell & Kirschman, supra note 110.
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my study contributes to research streams for worker safety in unionized workplaces,
company unionism, and employment for NCAA players.
A. Safety Practices in Unionized Workplaces Are Superior to Nonunion
Workplaces.143
A 5% increase in occupational fatalities occurs for every 1% decline in union
representation of employees in the workforce.144 Workplaces with unions are more
likely to offer intensive safety training.145 Unions also improve enforcement of

143
For more discussion regarding why unions play an important role in workplace
safety, see Barbara Hilyer, Laura Leviton, Lynn Overman & Snigdha Mukherjee, A UnionInitiated Safety Training Program Leads to Improved Workplace Safety, 24 LAB. STUD. J.
53 (2000) (suggesting that unions play an important role in workplace safety); Jill Kriesky
& Edwin Brown, The Union Role in Labor-Management Cooperation: A Case Study at the
Boise Cascade Company’s Jackson Mill, 18 LAB. STUD. J. 17 (1993); Margrit K.
Hugentobler, Thomas G. Robins & Susan J. Schurman, How Unions Can Improve the
Outcomes of Joint Health and Safety Training Programs, 15 LAB. STUD. J. 16 (1990). Many
labor agreements grant employees a right to refuse unsafe work—and some contracts. See
George R. Gray, Donald W. Myers & Phyllis S. Myers, Collective Bargaining Agreements:
Safety and Health Provisions, 121 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 13, 27 (1998). For a more recent
discussion, see Robert R. Sinclair, James E. Martin & Lindsay E. Sears, Labor Unions and
Safety Climate: Perceived Union Safety Values and Retail Employee Safety Outcomes, 42
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1477, 1486 (2010) (“[T]he link between union safety
values and safety motivation could reflect a social exchange process in which employees
who feel supported by their union reciprocate with greater safety motivation or it could
reflect a self-regulatory processes employees use to manage safety performance tradeoffs.”).
144
Michael Zoorob, Does ‘Right to Work’ Imperil the Right to Health? The Effect of
Labour Unions on Workplace Fatalities, 75 OCCUPATIONAL & ENV’T MED. 736 (2018)
(estimating the effect of unionization on occupational mortality per 100,000 workers from
1992–2016.).
145
Xuanwen Wang, Rebecca Katz & Xiuwen Sue Dong emphasize that:

[U]nion firms reported better performance of safety management and safety
culture than nonunion firms . . . . Union firms also adopted most of the
organization’s safety practices, safety policies, and safety culture indicators
included in this report. Moreover, union firms were more likely and frequently to
offer and require general safety and health training, and OSHA 10-hour and 30hour training to their employees. The results confirm that labor-management
cooperation is a win-win solution for improving safety management and safety
culture at workplaces which benefits not only construction workers, but also
construction contractors.
Xuanwen Wang, Rebecca Katz & Xiuwen Sue Dong, Union Effect on Safety Management
and Safety Culture in the Construction Industry, CPWR Q. DATA REP. 1, 20 (2018),
https://www.cpwr.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Quarter1-QDR-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7LW-JA33] (citation omitted).
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safety laws.146 Compared to nonunion counterparts, union employers use emerging
technologies such as drones, wearable devices, lasers, and robotics.147 Union
employers are also more likely to have site-specific safety plans.148
My study is relevant to these broader areas of workplace safety. The NFL,
comprised of thirty-two employers engaged in league-wide collective bargaining, is
the union employer in this natural experiment. Sixty-five Power 5 schools are the
nonunion, de facto employers. The higher proportion of disrupted college football
games implies that the lack of collectively bargained COVID-19 protocols at Power
5 schools hurt college football as an entertainment enterprise.149 A study of Ohio
State athletes with COVID-19 infections found that almost 46% had a physical
predictor of future heart disease.150 These results suggest that nonunion playing
146

See David Weil, Building Safety: The Role of Construction Unions in the
Enforcement of OSHA, 13 J. LAB. RSCH. 121, 127–30 (1992) (finding that unionized
construction workplaces provide more safety to employees). Unionized workplaces find
more OSHA violations than nonunion counterparts, reduce hazard abatement periods set by
OSHA, and add potency to calls for OSHA inspections. Id. Unions also increase an
employer’s price of being cited for OSHA violations because more of these problems are
flagged for inspectors. Id.
147
Survey: Construction Firms with Union Workers More Likely to Engage in Safety
Best Practices, Training, SAFETY+HEALTH (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.safetyandhealth
magazine.com/articles/17466-construction-firms-with-union-workers-more-likely-to-eng
age-in-safety-best-practices-training-survey [https://perma.cc/K9NR-XLKF] (finding, in a
survey of 334 firms, 90 of which employed only union workers, 109 of which employed
union and nonunion employees, and 135 of which employed only nonunion employees, that
“78.9 percent of union firms perform job hazard or safety analyses before construction starts,
compared with 55.6 percent of nonunion firms,” and “66.8 percent of union firms conduct
‘prompt/thorough’ near-miss and incident investigations, compared with 49.6 percent of
nonunion firms”).
148
Id. (“86.9 percent of union firms have a site-specific safety and health plan,
compared with 68.9 percent of nonunion firms.”).
149
See supra Table 11.
150
Rajpal et al., supra note 141. CMR imaging in 26 college athletes who tested positive
for COVID-19 (15 males, mean age 19.5 years) in football, soccer, lacrosse, basketball, and
track showed that 26.9% reported mild symptoms, while others were asymptomatic; none
showed heart-beat wave changes on electrocardiogram, and none had elevated serum levels
of troponin I. Id. at 118. However, after cardiac MRIs were performed on these subjects, four
players (15%, all males) had imaging consistent with myocarditis. Id. Two players also
exhibited mild heart condition symptoms (shortness of breath). Twelve players (46%) had
LGE, a medical acronym for late gadolinium enhancement. Id. Some small studies have
found that LGE observed by cardiac magnetic resonance testing “is a predictor of adverse
cardiovascular outcomes in patients with nonischemic cardiomyopathy (NICM).” Sujith
Kuruvilla, Nebiyu Adenaw, Arabindra B. Katwal, Michael J. Lipinski, Christopher M.
Kramer & Michael Salerno, Late Gadolinium Enhancement on Cardiac Magnetic Resonance
Predicts Adverse Cardiovascular Outcomes in Nonischemic Cardiomyopathy: A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 7 CIRCULATION: CARDIOVASCULAR IMAGING 250, 250 (2014)
(finding that patients with LGE had higher annualized mortality (4.7% for LGE-positive
subjects versus 1.7% for LGE-negative subjects)).
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conditions exposed college football players to long-term health risks. According to
the Myocarditis Foundation, this heart condition is related to 22% of sudden cardiac
deaths in athletes thirty-five years of age and younger.151 By comparison, pro
football players had collectively bargained protocols for special protections and
enhanced isolation for individual risk factors such as race, diabetes, hypertension,
and obesity.152
My conclusions relate to collective bargaining in professional sports. The
NLRA creates a duty to bargain wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment.153 This legal obligation includes bargaining over workplace safety
conditions.154 More closely related to COVID-19 safety protocols, the National
Labor Relations Board ruled that employers must bargain a drug-testing policy with
a union.155 These labor law developments paved the way for major leagues and
151

See Josh Peter, ‘It Saved My Kid’s Life:’ Why Aren’t All College Athletes with
COVID-19 Getting MRI Exams?, USA TODAY (Dec. 31, 2020, 12:47 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2020/12/30/covid-19-should-athletes-havecardiac-mri-before-returning-play/4080522001/ [https://perma.cc/BQ25-5F24].
152
See ADDENDUM, supra note 1, at 11.
153
The NLRA provides only a general statement of an employer’s and union’s mutual
obligation to bargain:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession. . . .
NLRA, supra note 49, at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747
(1962) (“Unilateral action by an employer without prior discussion with the union does
amount to a refusal to negotiate about the affected conditions of employment under
negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional
policy.”).
154
E.g., NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 924 F.2d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the “[u]nion’s right to information that is relevant to the Union’s performance of its
responsibilities is statutory and not contractual, especially when it concerns health and safety
conditions”).
155
See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180 (1989); Kysor Ind. Corp., 307
N.L.R.B. 598 (1992); Cf. Star Tribune Div., 295 N.L.R.B. 543 (1989) (holding that drug
testing for job applicants is not a mandatory subject of bargaining). The employer in
Johnson-Bateman Co. argued that it had a managerial right to impose drug testing without
mandatory bargaining—a view that is similar to how colleges formulated and implemented
COVID-19 testing policies without interacting with the NCAA’s Student-Athlete Advisory
Committee. See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. at 184; NCAA, Report of the NCAA
Division I Student-Athlete Advisory Committee for April, July, and August, supra note 88
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player unions to bargain over testing athletes for illicit and performance-enhancing
drugs—largely an interest of management.156
Collective bargaining allowed player unions to bring their health and safety
issues to negotiations with the leagues. For perspective, long before COVID-19, the
NFL and NFLPA agreed to substantial limits on full-pad, full-contact practices, a
safety measure to limit concussions.157 The NCAA lacks these limits on hitting

(none of the committee minutes mention discussions over COVID-19 testing policies with
the NCAA). The NLRB rejected the employer’s position in Johnson-Bateman Co. that it had
a unilateral right to dictate drug testing, even if the employer’s purpose was to promote a
safe workplace. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. at 182 (concluding that the “newly imposed
requirement of drug/alcohol testing for employees who require medical treatment for work
injuries is a mandatory subject of bargaining”). The NLRB added that “we find the
drug/alcohol testing requirement to be both germane to the working environment, and outside
the scope of managerial decisions lying at the core of entrepreneurial control.” Id. In a related
vein, physical testing of employees is part of an employer’s duty to bargain. See LeRoy
Machine Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1432, 1438–39 (1964); see also Lockheed Shipbuilding
& Constr. Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 171, 178 (1984) (holding that a company could not use medical
screening programs for the purpose of terminating new employees or refusing to hire
applicants without notifying, bargaining, and agreeing with the relevant Unions); Lockheed
Shipbuilding & Constr. Co., 278 N.L.R.B. 18 (1986) (supplementing the prior decision).
156
See Glenn M. Wong & Richard J. Ensor, Major League Baseball and Drugs: Fight
the Problem or the Player?, 11 NOVA L. REV. 779, 794–804 (1987) (reviewing the origins
of drug testing in professional baseball in the 1980s); Stephen F. Brock & Kevin M.
McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 DICK. L. REV. 505, 513–32 (1988) (reviewing drug
testing in professional sports in the 1980s). “In contrast to the situation in professional
football and basketball, major league baseball (MLB) has in effect no agreement expressly
governing drug testing of its players.” Id. at 518–19; see also MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL,
JOINT DRUG PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAM, 8, 15–17, 42, (2006),
http://www.mlb.com/pa/pdf/jda.pdf [https://perma.cc/LBE5-X3Q5] (last visited July 9,
2021) (banning performance-enhancing substances, providing random drug testing both
during the season and the offseason, and imposing significant penalties at Major League
Baseball, Major League Baseball’s Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program); Adam
M. Finkel, Christopher R. Deubert, Orly Lobel, I. Glenn Cohen & Holly Fernandez Lynch,
The NFL as a Workplace: The Prospect of Applying Occupational Health and Safety Law to
Protect NFL Workers, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 347 (2018) (“Since 1968, The NFL and NFLPA
have negotiated ten CBAs. The most recent CBA (executed in 2011) is 301 pages long and
governs nearly every aspect of the NFL. Thus, . . . the parties have resolved most issues
concerning player health and safety via the collective bargaining process. . . .”).
157
Mark Maske, New Rules on NFL Contact Haven’t Altered Training Camps Much,
WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/new-ruleson-nfl-contact-havent-altered-training-camps-much/2011/08/13/gIQA68BvDJ_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6ZHF-UAWN] (“[The] medical director of the NFL Players Association[]
said the union’s goal [in proposing this limitation] was to reduce players’ exposure to
practice-field blows to the head by 20 to 25 percent.”); see also Alan Blinder, Football
Practices Pose More Concussion Risk Than Games, Study Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/01/sports/concussions-college-football-practice.
html [https://perma.cc/T8UL-S5MB].
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during practices,158 with alarming consequences for college players.159 This
difference in safety protection for NFL and NCAA football players was repeated
during the pandemic. Just before the virus reached severe transmission levels in the
U.S. in 2020, the NFL and NFLPA entered into a labor agreement that covered a
wide range of health and safety polices to benefit players’ safety.160 A short time
later, they negotiated the addendum for COVID-19 protocols. Similar to
construction unions that rigorously enforce safety standards,161 the NFLPA set up a
whistleblower hotline to report breaches of these safety policies and practices.162
Also, like unions in the construction industry, the NFLPA and NFL adopted stateof-the-art technology—in this instance, KINEXON contact tracking devices.163 I
found no evidence of this technology adoption in survey responses, though later in
the fall, at least one conference adopted KINEXON.164

158

Id. (explaining that while the NCAA has guidelines, its disjointed rule-making
process allows leagues to set their own policies and only one league has opted to ban fullcontact hits during practice).
159
Michael A. McCrea, Alok Shah, Stefan Duma, Steven Rowson, Jaroslaw Harezlak,
Thomas W. McAllister, Steven P. Broglio, Christopher C. Giza, Joshua Goldman, Kenneth
L. Cameron, Megan N. Houston, Gerald McGinty, Jonathan C. Jackson, Kevin Guskiewicz,
Jason P. Mihalik, M. Alison Brooks, Paul Pasquina & Brian D. Stemper, Opportunities for
Prevention of Concussion and Repetitive Head Impact Exposure in College Football
Players, 78 JAMA NEUROLOGY (2021) (concluding that most concussions and High Impact
Events occurred during football practices and the pre-season).
160
A summary of these policy improvements and key benefits includes:
Improved health and safety: guaranteed funding for research on training methods,
equipment, field surfaces, and medical care; the formation of a new committee to
design safety standards for equipment; the extension of training camp acclimation
periods; further strengthened credentialing standards for team medical and
training staffs; enhanced enforcement of the concussion protocol; and additional
joint research funding.
NFL, 2020 NFL-NFLPA CBA: Need to Know, https://operations.nfl.com/inside-footballops/players-legends/2020-nfl-nflpa-cba-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/H5J2-MD4Q] (last
visited July 9, 2021).
161
Weil, supra note 146, at 130.
162
Alex Prewitt, The NFLPA Has Set Up a Whistleblower Hotline to Report Health and
Safety Violations, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.si.com/nfl/2020/08/05/
nflpa-whistleblower-hotline-health-safety [https://perma.cc/3VLN-FJRX].
163
Supra, Finding 8.
164
Pac-12 to Utilize KINEXON, supra note 122.
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B. “Company Unionism” Continues Long After Enactment of the NLRA
SAAC’s nearly complete silence on COVID-19 policies signified its captive
role as a voice for NCAA players.165 SAAC’s cooptation mirrored company unions
in the years preceding the NLRA.166 These organizations proliferated during the
Great Depression.167 Employers implemented them in response to growing calls for
legislation to allow collective bargaining for workers. The N.R.A. encouraged
employers voluntarily to bargain with unions.168 It was a sop to workers, similar to
current Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) laws that prohibit NCAA schools from
penalizing college athletes from marketing themselves for money.169 Like the
165

NCAA, Report of the NCAA Division I Student-Athlete Advisory Committee for
April, July, and August, supra note 88.
166
Stanford SAAC, supra note 91.
167
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT., BULL. NO. 2070, HANDBOOK OF LAB.
STAT. supra note 75, at 412 tbl. 165 col. 7.
168
Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 “[t]o encourage
national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of
certain useful public works . . . .” National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), ch. 90, 48 Stat.
195 (1933), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 US. 495, 551 (1935).
In its brief time as a transitional labor law that was eventually replaced by the National Labor
Relations Act, NIRA (also called the N.R.A.) spurred workers to join unions and also
prompted employers to blunt this development by forming “company unions.”
Concurrent with this growth in trade unionism was an even greater increase in
company unions. Of all the company unions in existence in 1935, nearly twothirds were established during the N.R.A. In a number of plants, both company
unions and trade unions were established, with overlapping of membership and
jurisdiction.
U.S. DEP’T. OF LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT., BULL. NO. 634, CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPANY
UNIONS 28 (1937).
169
California offers an analogous development to company unions as a half-measure
for NCAA players. In 2019, the state enacted a “pay to play” law that allows NCAA athletes
to market their name, image, and likeness (NIL) for monetary compensation without
incurring a penalty from a California public university or college. S.B. 206, 2019-2020 Leg.,
Reg. Sess., ch. 383 (Cal. 2019). Section 2 adds to Section 67457 of the Education Code,
stating:
A postsecondary educational institution shall not uphold any rule, requirement,
standard, or other limitation that prevents a student of that institution participating
in intercollegiate athletics from earning compensation as a result of the use of the
student’s name, image, or likeness. Earning compensation from the use of a
student’s name, image, or likeness shall not affect the student’s scholarship
eligibility.
Id. § 67457(a)(1).

1072

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

N.R.A., NIL laws obliquely address a more fundamental concern of workers. N.R.A.
shielded workers from “yellow dog” contracts that employers required workers to
sign as a condition of employment.170 Similarly, the NCAA’s strict limits on
financial assistance for players,171 and related penalties for violations,172 are like the
take-it-or-leave-it terms in yellow dog contracts—agreements that employers forced
workers to sign to prohibit their joining a union.173 NIL legislation provides college
players a work-around for earning money related to their NCAA activities but fails
to address the root problem of the NCAA’s self-serving amateurism model. It is
likely that the NFL players association would not have been a strong voice during a
pandemic if the N.R.A. had not been replaced by the NLRA, with its legal process
for unions to bargain with employers.174
By early 2020, dozens of states considered similar legislation. See Alan Blinder, After
California Law, Statehouses Push to Expand Rights of College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/sports/ncaa-athletes-pay-california.html
[https://perma.cc/J3QX-M6LR]. More recently, the NCAA has announced plans to allow
players to accept NIL compensation. See Billy Witz, NCAA Outlines Plans for Players to
Make Endorsement Deals, N.Y. TIMES (April 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04
/29/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-athlete-endorsements.html [https://perma.cc/3BT6-FKCJ].
170
See Impact of the Courts Upon the NRA Program: Judicial Administration of NIRA,
44 YALE L.J. 90, 106 (1934) (“A supplemental right to that of collective bargaining has also
been acquired by labor through the medium of Section 7(a). This is the negative, but
nevertheless, important, right of freedom from ‘yellow dog’ contracts.”).
171
2020–21 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 48, at art. 12.01.4 (“Permissible Grant-in-Aid.
A grant-in-aid administered by an educational institution is not considered to be pay or the
promise of pay for athletics skill, provided it does not exceed the financial aid limitations set
by the Association’s membership.”); see also id. at art. 15.1 (“Maximum Limit on Financial
Aid—Individual. [A] A student-athlete shall not be eligible to participate in intercollegiate
athletics if he or she receives financial aid that exceeds the value of the cost of attendance as
defined in Bylaw.”).
172
Regarding “Amateur Status,” the 2020–21 NCAA Manual notes that:
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
competition in a particular sport if the individual: . . . (a) Uses athletics skill
(directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; (b) Accepts a promise of
pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate
athletics participation . . . .
2020–21 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 48, art. 12.1.2.
173
A “yellow dog” contract was its prohibition against the employee from joining a
union. Courts uniformly struck down laws that barred these employment contracts. See
Federal Protection of Collective Bargaining Under the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 40 YALE
L. J. 92, 93 (1930). For a more comprehensive treatment of these contracts, see Cornelius
Cochrane, Why Organized Labor Is Fighting Yellow Dog Contracts, 15 AM. LAB. LEG. REV.
227 (1925).
174
Senator Robert Wagner described the significance of a law that would enable
employees to bargain over wages and conditions of employment when he remarked: “While
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C. Employment for NCAA Players Is More Appropriate than Their Outmoded
Amateur Status
This study shifts the perspective for treating NCAA players as employees. Payfor-play remains important given that NCAA conferences and athletic programs reap
a financial bonanza175 (and considering the large disparity in wealth generated by
Black players that is transferred as rents to white coaches).176 However, player safety
and welfare are an important justification for legalizing the employment of NCAA
players.
By using data, this study shows specific areas where Power 5 schools did not
manage player health and welfare with the same rigor as the NFL and players
associations. College football had proportionally more disrupted games than the
NFL.177 Making this disparity more remarkable, college teams in the Big 12 and
SEC announced that games would be played provided that teams could field a roster
with fifty-three active players—in other words, a team would be required to play
even if thirty-two players on its roster of eighty-five scholarship players were unable
to play.178
These findings raise worrisome questions about the long-term impact of
playing a season of college football during the pandemic of 2020. It bears repeating
that an Ohio State medical study showed that 46% of COVID-19 positive players
had cardiac imaging associated with much higher mortality rates over time.179 Who
will bear the cost if they suffer significant heart problems or die because of heartrelated conditions as middle-aged adults? The players will almost certainly bear
the bill explicitly states the right of employees to organize, their unification will prove of
little value if it is to be used solely for Saturday night dances and Sunday afternoon picnics.”
Natl. Lab. Relations Bd.: Hearing on S. 1958 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 74th
Cong. 1373, 1419 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert Wagner).
175
See NCAA, Financial Database Homepage Data Summary (Nov. 2019), (copy on
file with author). In 2018, “FBS DI Autonomy Schools” generated $7.98 billion, with 34.1%
coming from media rights, yielding approximately $2.69 billion. See also Schoenfeld, supra
note 114 (noting that in 2017, Big 10 signed a $2.64 billion, six-year deal with Fox Sports,
ESPN, and CBS).
176
Craig Garthwaite, Jordan Keener, Matthew J. Notowidigdo & Nicole F.
Ozminkowski, Who Profits from Amateurism? Rent Sharing in Modern College Sports,
NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH., (Working Paper No. 27734, Aug. 2020),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27734 [https://perma.cc/Z26Z-HN5T]. This recent economics
study concluded that “(t)he athletes generating the rents are more likely to be [B]lack and
come from lower-income neighborhoods, and the rents are shared with a set of athletes and
coaches that are more likely to be white.” Id. at 34.
177
Supra Table 11.
178
David Cobb, SEC Announces Minimum Roster Requirements for Its 2020 College
Football Season, COVID-19 Protocols, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 18, 2020, 2:17 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/sec-announces-minimum-roster-require
ments-for-its-2020-college-football-season-covid-19-protocols/
[https://perma.cc/6LT63JZM].
179
Rajpal et al., supra note 141.
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those costs without any financial assistance from their schools. In contrast, the NFL
and NFLPA have negotiated retiree health and welfare benefits.180 As employees,
NFL players are also eligible to claim workers’ compensation treatment arising out
of an injury they incurred in the course of their employment.181 College football
players have nothing like this.182 Workers’ compensation laws require a claimant to
show that an injury was incurred in the course of employment, thus excluding
injuries incurred by amateur athletes.183
In short, college football players were young adults during the 2020 season who
played without any legal representation and without a student advisory committee
that advocated for their safety. These players might pay football-related medical
costs out of their pockets in the 2030s and beyond for playing during a pandemic in
2020. At this early point in observing COVID-19 effects, several college athletes
have died,184 several suffered severe infections,185 and a star basketball player
180

NFLPA, supra note 83, at art. 53, 60–63.
A former player for the Chicago Bears petitioned under the Illinois Worker’s
Compensation Act for “open medical rights” related to the progression of an injury incurred
during games he played for the team. Rashied Davis, Petitioner, 08 IL. W.C. 2862 (Ill. Indus.
Com’n Nov. 2, 2018). After his career ended, the player was entitled to open medical rights
under Section 8(a) of the Act “for any reasonable and related medical expenses relating
specifically to neck or cervical spine, subject to review per provisions of the Act.” Id. at *2.
The Commission also ordered the team to authorize and pay for recommended spinal disc
surgery and related medical expenses prospectively.
182
Michael H. LeRoy, Harassment, Abuse, and Mistreatment in College Sports:
Protecting Players Through Employment Laws, 42 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L 117, 163
(2021) (“NCAA athletes would be eligible for medical treatment, long-term care, partial
income replacement, and compensation for physical or psychological impairment under state
workers’ compensation laws.”).
183
Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2 1170, 1174 (Ind. 1983)
(“Rensing did not receive ‘pay’ for playing football at the University within the meaning of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act; therefore, an essential element of the employeremployee relationship was missing in addition to the lack of intent.”).
184
Lisa Kearns, Kathleen Bachynski & Arthur L. Caplan, Add Covid-Related
Myocarditis, Mechanical Ventilation, and Death to this Year’s Football Risks, STAT (Nov.
26, 2020) https://www.statnews.com/2020/11/26/myocarditis-mechanical-ventilationdeath-join-football-risks-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/3VQG-2DWA] (detailing how Jamain
Stephens Jr., a defensive lineman for California University of Pennsylvania, died from a
blood clot in his heart after contracting COVID-19); Nathan Kalman-Lamb, Derek Silva &
Johanna Mellis, A Ruthlessly Exploitative College Football Season Finally Draws to a Close,
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2021, 5:00 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/jan/11/
college-football-covid-19-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/HLY6-A7QF] (detailing how
Appalachian State University student and basketball player, Chad Dorrill, died from COVID19).
185
David M. Hale, Clemson Tigers’ Justin Foster Retires from Football, Citing Issues
with Asthma, COVID-19, ESPN (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.espn.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/30958869/clemson-justin-foster-retires-citing-issues-asthma-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/YH52-RA8Y] (reporting that Justin Foster and Xavier Thomas
181
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collapsed during a game due to a heart condition associated with COVID-19.186 High
school athletes who played in 2020 are also showing signs of heart damage.187 The
better players of this group may play in college—again, without the benefit of an
employment relationship, access to workers’ compensation, or the ability to form a
labor union—and be forced to use a COVID-19 plan that was inferior to the plan
that the NFL and NFLPA bargained.
The best model for allowing these players to form a union is the Railway Labor
Act, an early labor law that spans public- and private-sector employment and relates
to specific rail and air transportation industries.188 This law was passed by Congress
because of the singular importance of uninterrupted interstate travel and the need to
minimize labor disputes and disruptions.189 An industry-specific labor law for major

experienced severe COVID-19 symptoms that respectively ended and limited their football
careers). See also Zach Osterman, Viral Facebook Post from IU Football Player’s Mom
About Son’s COVID-19 Issues Serves as Warning, INDYSTAR (Aug. 3, 2020, 5:25 PM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/sports/college/indiana/2020/08/03/iu-football-playersmother-posts-covid-19-diagnosis/5577215002/ [https://perma.cc/74NL-574Y] (detailing
how Brady Feeney, a freshman lineman, was hospitalized after contracting a severe infection
during summer workouts with this team).
186
Gainesville Sun Ed. Bd., Consider Health Risks for College Athletes, GAINESVILLE
SUN (Dec. 16, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.gainesville.com/story/opinion/2020/12/16/
editorial-consider-health-risks-college-athletes/3920074001/
[https://perma.cc/PC3PB6P3]. Keyontae Johnson, a twenty-one-year-old basketball player for the University of
Florida, collapsed in a December 2020 game with Florida State and was airlifted to a hospital.
Id. He was diagnosed with myocarditis, a heart condition associated with COVID-19. Zach
Abolverdi, Florida’s Keyontae Johnson Diagnosed with Heart Inflammation Following
Collapse at Game, GAINESVILLE SUN (Dec. 22, 2020, 7:10 PM EST),
https://www.gatorsports.com/story/basketball/2020/12/22/florida-gators-keyontae-johnsonhas-season-ending-heart-issue/4006117001/ [https://perma.cc/BVX3-6GNQ].
187
Kearns et al., supra note 184 (detailing how Mississippi high school football player
was hospitalized in critical condition with COVID-19).
188
NLRA, supra note 49.
189
A succinct summary of this law appears in Slocum v. Delaware, which states:
The first declared purpose of the Railway Labor Act is ‘To avoid any interruption
to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein.’ This purpose
extends both to disputes concerning the making of collective agreements and to
grievances arising under existing agreements. The plan of the Act is to provide
administrative methods for settling disputes before they reach acute stages that
might be provocative of strikes. Carriers are therefore required to negotiate with
bargaining representatives of the employees. The Act also sets up machinery for
conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and adjustment of disputes, to be invoked if
negotiations fail.
Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 242 (1950) (citations omitted).
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revenue NCAA sports patterned after the RLA could cover public- and privatesector institutions.190
While my research compares NFL and Power 5 COVID-19 protocols, it
sharpens the focus on how college football bends its rules to favor its elites191 and
amplifies an ideology of ignoring basic health and safety practices.192 My study
documents policy discrepancies for schools within the same conference, a finding
that implies that teams did not play by the same COVID-19 rules for football.
Schools were free to adopt more rigorous policies, but some discrepancies within a
conference could mean that some schools were unable to scale up COVID-19
protocols, or worse, that they cut safety corners.
Reinforcing these unsettling possibilities, no policy required schools to report
and share information about COVID-19 practices and testing trends with their
conference or the NCAA. Nor did a policy reference a requirement to use an outside
entity—a conference or the NCAA—to monitor schools for COVID-19 policy
compliance. Considering the history of cheating in NCAA athletics,193 this, too, was
unsettling.
190

Congress appears to have constitutional authority to regulate the NCAA as the
Sherman Act applies college athletics. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 958 F.3d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d, Am.
Athletic Conf. v. NCAA, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (holding that the NCAA violated federal
antitrust law by limiting compensation student-athletes could receive in exchange for their
athletic services).
191
Amy Daughters, How the Big Ten Changed Its Mind Three Times and Altered the
Outcome of the 2020–21 CFB Season, FBSCHEDULES (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://fbschedules.com/how-the-big-ten-changed-its-mind-three-times-and-altered-the-out
come-of-the-2020-21-cfb-season/ [https://perma.cc/3DV6-4TRB] (describing several flipflops by the Big 10 in scheduling football games in 2020 and reversing its own rules to allow
Ohio State to play for the conference championship).
192
Kent Babb, A College Football Coach’s Season at War with the Coronavirus — and
His Own School, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2021, 2:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
sports/2021/01/19/tony-franklin-middle-tennessee-football-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/
FBS6-UAU8] (providing one example, Tony Franklin, offensive coordinator for Middle
Tennessee State, who left the school after fighting with the head coach and administration
over the necessity of wearing masks to prevent spread of COVID-19).
193
The Most Notable College Sports Cheating Scandals, RANKER (June 23, 2020),
https://www.ranker.com/list/college-sports-cheating-scandals/swiperight [https://perma.cc/
D8MR-BAYT]. The list’s top scandals include: (1) Louisville’s use of sex workers to entice
players to play for a championship team in 2013 (the NCAA took away the title in 2018), (2)
Colorado football’s use of sexual escorts to recruit players under Coach Gary Barnett, (3)
UNC basketball’s 18-year practice of enrolling players in no-work classes with little faculty
supervision, (4) Oklahoma football’s offers of cars and money to players, (5) University of
Miami’s defrauding of federal Pell Grant program to funnel $220,000 to players, (6)
Alabama’s $200,000 bribe of a high school player as a recruiting inducement, (7) SMU’s
payments to football players resulting in suspension of football for two years at the school,
(8) Southwestern Louisiana’s fraudulent grading scheme for football resulting in a two-year
ban of the sport, (9) Kentucky basketball’s point-shaving scheme in 1951, and (10) Florida
State’s exam cheating scandal. Id.
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These unresolved questions underscore a more general benefit of unionization
in sports. Players on teams throughout a league can have an independent voice to
bargain—and then, to enforce—uniform conditions of competition. Ironically, this
function of a professional sports union dovetails with the foundational purpose of
the NCAA—to foster rules in athletic competitions under conditions of rigid
uniformity. Yet, the NCAA’s insistence on maintaining an obsolete ideal of
amateurism poorly serves player health while Power 5 money-making teams can
exploit player safety for the glory of winning.194 The 2020 football season served as
a natural experiment that shed new light on how laws prohibiting college football
players from forming a labor union shortchanged players.

194
See, e.g., Billy Witz, With Injury, Justin Fields Is Taking a Big Risk for Ohio State,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/sports/ncaafootball/jus
tin-fields-ohio-state.html [https://perma.cc/WE9C-SRL4] (discussing a Penn State physician
who was removed from the football team after clashing with Head Coach James Franklin
over withholding medical information to injured players).

